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The structure of the international system underwent a fundamental change with
the end of the cold war. The shift from bipolarity to multipolarity has loosened many
of the constraints on the balancing behavior of the states that make up that system.
Using neorealist theory, this paper examines the balancing choices of states in a
multipolar world. Neorealism is clear in suggesting that under bipolarity, the great
powers' balancing choice was inclined toward internal balancing—the development
of one's own economic or military power. In a multipolar system, however, great
powers will have greater opportunities for external balancing—allying with other
powers.
Additionally, the presence of nuclear weapons provides small states with the
ability to balance against great powers. This may lead them to abandon their
traditional reliance on alliances with great powers as the primary means for providing
for their security.
The European states system in the period 1856-1878 is used as a case study.
Findings suggest that those states with the capability to balance internally do so.
Using that knowledge, it is predicted that in the current era internal balancing will
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The structure of the international system underwent a fundamental
change with the end of the cold war. The shift from bipolarity to multipolarity has
loosened many of the constraints on the balancing behavior of the states that
make up that system. This paper uses neorealist theory to attempt to predict
whether the states in a multipolar system are more likely to balance via internal
(developing military and/or economic capability) or external (forming or
strengthening existing alliances or weakening those of an opponent) methods.
Neorealist theory is clear in suggesting that under bipolarity, the great powers'
balancing choices are principally oriented toward internal balancing—the
development of one's own economic or military power. In a multipolar system,
however, great powers will once again have increased opportunities for external
balancing—forming or strengthening existing alliances or weakening those of an
opponent.
While neorealist theory joins other balance of power theories in
predicting that systemic factors will drive states to balance against power rather
than bandwagoning with it, there has not been any clear statement concerning
that choice. Using neorealist theory, this paper develops hypotheses
concerning the balancing choices of states in a multipolar world. Additionally, as
the presence of nuclear weapons provides smaller powers the ability to balance
the great powers efficiently and effectively, it is suggested that this may lead
IX
smaller powers to abandon their traditional reliance on alliances as the primary
means for providing for their security.
Structural theory holds that international political outcomes are not
determined by what a state is like but rather by the constraining and disposing
force of the system on the units. The structure of the system is taken to be that
of anarchy—the absence of a central authority which states are obligated to
obey. The condition of anarchy suggests that the primary goal of states is
achieving their own security, and that the use of force is an option for achieving
that goal. States are therefore concerned not only about their own power, but
about the level of that power relative to other states in the system. The actions
taken by states to preserve their security and relative position result in the
formation of balances of power.
The European states system in the period 1856-1878 is used as a case
study. That period was selected for its similarity to the current era. In both
cases the structure which had constrained the actions of the great powers in
those systems has undergone a significant change. In the nineteenth century
this re-structuring was do to the breakup of the Concert System, whose end was
signalled by the Crimean War. In the current era the restructuring of the system
is the result of the end of the cold war
—
punctuated by the dissolution of the •
Soviet Union. Both cases also find a single predominant power (Great Britain
and the United States, respectively) within an array of great powers whose
balancing choices will have a significant impact on its security.
Findings from the nineteenth century case suggest that great powers are
sensitive to the non-economic costs of alliance: uncertainty, abandonment,
entrapment and the loss of sovereignty. Accordingly, those states with the
capability to balance internally are likely to eschew alliance. That a state could
do so is related to its ability to provide for its own security by internal means.
Using that knowledge, it is predicted that in the current era internal
balancing will also be prevalent. If states which possess the capability to
provide reasonably for their own defense prefer to forego alliances, the
implication is for a loosening of the current alliance structure which is a holdover
form the bipolar era. In addition, the presence and probable proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction provides the necessary means to achieve this
internal balancing to an increasing number of states. An examination of those
states which did not have security guarantees from one of the superpowers
during the cold war shows that fifty percent of them either did or were suspected
of trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. As a consequence, it is
predicted that if states chose to balance against the hegemony of the United
States acquisition of WMD will be one of the means by which they will do so.
Structural factors may, however, be underdeterminate in the nuclear era, and
other determinants of a state's security policy (domestic political factors,
bureaucratic politics, the impact of international treaties or organization) may




As long as there have been systems of states, those persons who have thought
about international relations have recognized the tendency of the actors within those
systems to form balances of power. Thucydides, for instance, writing in the fifth
century BC, referred directly to the maintenance of such a balance between the Greek
city-states as being among the main causes of the Peloponnesian War when he wrote
"The growth in the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedemon,
made war inevitable." 1 Balance of power was similarly recognized by Machiavelli,
Hobbes and Montesquieu, but "[these] writers themselves only nibbled at the edges of
the subject,"2 rather than systematizing or developing a full theory of it. Further
attempts to do so were made, with varying degrees of success, by David Hume, A. F.
Pollard, Edward Gulick, George Liska, and Hans J. Morgenthau, among others, 3 and
yet, although the discourse was extensive, the subject remained elusive.
1Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Crawley. New
York: Modern Library, 1951. Book I, paragraph 24 [Chapter I, Modern Library edition,
p. 15].
2
Gulick, Edward Vose. Europe's Classical Balance of Power. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1955. p. vii.
3 David Hume (1742), "Of the Balance of Power,"in Charles W. Hendel (ed.),
David Hume's Political Essays ( Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953). A. F. Pollard,-
"Balance of Power," (Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, II [March
1923]). Edward Gulick, op cit. George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of
Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962). Hans J. Morgenthau,
Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948). See also Stanley Hoffman, The State
of War (New York: Praeger, 1965), Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957) and Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in
World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963).
1
One of the problems in balance of power theory lay in developing an adequate
definition of the phenomenon. As A. F. Pollard noted, balance of power "may mean
almost anything; and is used not only in different senses by different people, or in
different senses by the same people at different times, but in different senses by the
same person at the same time."4 Hans J. Morgenthau, for instance, who devotes an
entire section of his realist classic Politics Among Nations to the subject, defines it in
four ways: "... (1) as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, (2) as an actual state
of affairs, (3) as an approximately equal distribution of power, (4) as any distribution of
power."5 The inability to define the term coherently meant that "Morgenthau was
unable to create a consistent and convincing theory."6
A leading theory in international relations today is neorealism, particularly
those ideas put forth by Kenneth N. Waltz in Theory of International Politics 7 In his
work he explicitly attempts to "cut through" the "confusion" surrounding this issue. 8 "If
quoted in Gulick, p. v.
Morgenthau, p. 167n.
6 Keohane, Robert 0., ed. Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986. p. 13.
7 Although Waltz's work is a landmark, it is not without critics. See Robert 0.
Keohane, ed. Neorealism and its Critics. (New York: Columbia University Press,-
1986). Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little develop a theory of structural
realism in The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993) which, although it uses Waltz as a jumping off point,
comes to somewhat different conclusions.
8 Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House,
1979. p. 117.
there is any distinctively political theory of international politics," Waltz writes,
"balance of power theory is it."9 Waltz, by focusing on the "competitive, anarchic
nature of world politics as a whole," 10 develops his theory based on the international
system rather than on the character or motivations of the actors within it. His central
arguments are based on the structure of the system and both the constraints which it
imposes on those actors and the affect of the interactions of the units on that
structure. Waltz uses this framework of systems and structure to develop a theory of
balance of power which "will account for the recurrent formation of balances of power
in world politics, and tell us how changing power configurations affect patterns of
alignments and conflict in world politics." 11
Perhaps the most important concept associated with this, as with any other,
theory of balance of power is that of balancing itself. The theory holds that states will
"behave in ways that result in balances forming," 12 and that such behavior can take
the form of either internal (increasing a state's own economic or military capability) or
external (strengthening or enlarging one's own alliance or weakening the opposing
one) efforts. Although Waltz's theory represents a significant enhancement of the
concept of balance of power, it has a shortcoming in that it does not offer substantive
hypotheses about which method of balancing a state will adopt or why.
9
Ibid.
10 Keohane, p. 13.
11
Ibid, p. 15.
12 Waltz, 1979. p. 125.
A. PURPOSE
"The fundamental problem of international relations in the contemporary world,"
writes Robert Gilpin, " is the problem of peaceful adjustment to the consequences of
the uneven growth of power among states, just as it was in the past." 13 He goes on to
say that "Throughout history the primary means of resolving the disequilibrium
between the structure of the international system and the redistribution of power has
been war. . . " 14 The world now finds itself in a period that may be characterized in
that way. The unification of Germany, the increasing economic power of Japan, the
economic potential of China, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union—leaving the
United States as the system's only superpower—are all indicators of just such an
uneven growth of power and of dis-equilibrium in the system. A clearer understanding
of the response of states to these obstacles would play an important role not only in
the determination of policy, but in the preservation of peaceful relations among them.
The leading theory of international politics does not, however, offer an adequate tool
for understanding of those responses.
The purposes of this paper are to address that shortcoming and to attempt to
fill that lacuna in neorealist theory. It will do so by examining the major works of
neorealism in order to determine which method of balancing states are likely to
employ in an anarchic, multipolar system. Specifically, the goals are to (1 ) try to
13
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981. p. 180.
14
Ibid., p. 197.
make a contribution to international relations theory in an area which may not have
received adequate attention, and (2) try to enhance the usefulness of international
relations theory as a policy tool in a period during which the international system is in
a state of flux.
B. RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES
The methodology for this work is straightforward. It begins with an examination
of neorealist theory and its predictions about the behavior of states. Its dominant
conclusions about balance of power and balancing behavior are drawn out from this
theoretical investigation and discussed. Hypotheses are then generated based on
this examination of the theory which, it is hoped, will more completely explain the
balancing behavior of the actors in the system. Those hypotheses will then be tested
against an historical case which, as discussed below, should provide a rigorous test
of them. Appropriate conclusions will be drawn and applied to an examination of the
post-cold war international system with a view toward predicting the behavior of the
states which make up that system.
The principal historical data will be an investigation of the actions of the
European powers in relation to Great Britain—the predominant power during the mid-
nineteenth century—in the period from the end of the Crimean War, seen as marking
the end of an effective "Concert System" on the continent 15
,
and the Berlin
15 By Gordon Craig, among others. See "The System of Alliances and the
Balance of Power" in The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 10. The Zenith of
European Power, 1830-70, J. P. T. Bury, ed. (Cambridge, 1960, p. 267).
Conference of 1878 which achieved a settlement of the Russo-Turkish conflict of
1877-78. The second area of inquiry will be the actions of rising powers relative to,
and the responses of, the United States in the post-cold war era. Nominally beginning
with the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the case will focus on current events as
well as offer prediction about future ones. The central questions are: (1 ) Which of the
hypotheses provides the greatest explanatory power for the balancing behavior of
states? and (2) Are there conditions which can be identified which affect which type of
behavior is to be expected (i. e., which hypothesis is most likely to apply)? 16
1. Theory
The primary body of theory will be, as discussed above, that of neorealism
—
more fully discussed in Chapter II. The major advance from traditional realist thinking
is the concept of structure and the use of structural effects to explain the actions of
the actors within the system. Hypotheses will be based on neorealist theory, primarily
that postulated by Waltz, as well as that of the security dilemma, collective goods,
theories of alliance formation and the changes wrought by nuclear weapons.
Waltz's refinement of balance of power theory leaves out a critical element.
Although he states that balancing may occur either internally or externally, he shows
little theoretical preference for either. That does not mean, of course, that the issue
does not receive any attention— it does. It is not, however, fully developed. The
16 These same questions are asked by Stephen M. Walt concerning his
hypotheses in The Origins of Alliances, p. 11.
prevalence of internal balancing in a bipolar world is noted and in fact it is this internal
balancing which allows Waltz to maintain that balance of power theory applies in a
system dominated by fewer than three powers. 17 Waltz also discusses the
implications of external balancing extensively and generates hypotheses about
whether states will join weaker or stronger coalitions. His omission of similar in depth
discussion of the choice between internal and external balance perhaps shows
favoritism toward the external but does so without theoretical grounding. 18 Now that
the bipolarity of the cold war has passed, however, the question of internal vs.
external balancing needs to be revisited. 19 This is particularly important for the United
States. As the preeminent power among the world's actors, it should find itself the
one against which most of this balancing should occur. 20
17
Waltz, 1979. p. 118.
18 Waltz, 1979. pp. 126-127 and 164-165.
19 That the system is no longer bipolar is a view held by many, but not by Waltz
himself. Waltz maintains that "bipolarity endures, but in an altered state. Bipolarity
continues because militarily Russia can take care of itself and because no other great
powers have yet emerged." ("The Emerging Structure of International Politics,"
International Security, 18:2, p. 52) Samuel Huntington characterizes the world as "uni-
multipolar" with the US as the sole superpower in the company of six other major
powers. ("America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, 33:1, p. 6) Christopher
Layne characterizes the system as unipolar, but warns of the rise of other great powers
in "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security,
17:4, pp. 5-51.
20 A point argued by Christopher Layne in "The Unipolar Illusion," where he
writes: "states balance against hegemons, even those like the United States that seek
to maintain their preeminence by employing strategies based more on benevolence
than coercion." (p. 7).
Other balance of power theorists have focused on the external balance
—primarily the formation of opposing coalitions
—
perhaps because the phenomenon
is more readily observable and quantifiable. Stephen M. Walt, for instance, states in
The Origins of Alliances that "When confronted by a significant external threat, states
may either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against
the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger."21
Admittedly his work is about alliances, but it is curious that the idea of internal
balancing has been removed altogether by his definition. 22
Nuclear weapons also will play an important role in determining the actions of
states. Their introduction provides a radically new method for internal balancing.
Here states have a new opportunity to provide for their own security which is relatively
cost-effective. As Waltz points out, nuclear weapons "make estimating the strategic
strength of nations a simple task, and make balancing easy to do."23 Under the
bipolar alliance structure, nuclear weapons were less necessary due to the nuclear
guarantees provided by the superpowers. The breakup of that structure should not
only increase their desirability but also their obtainability as more weapons-grade
21
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1987. p. 17.
22 A criticism also leveled by Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance and Stability,
International Organization, 45:1 (Winter 1991 ), pp. 121-142. Snyder writes that "A fully
developed theory of alliances would have to deal with choices between alliances and
other means to security . . . ." (p. 128).
23 Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Emerging Structure of World Politics," International
Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 74. Also see Waltz's The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: More May Be Better. Adelphi Papers, No. 171. London, IISS, 1981.
8
material becomes more available, as the technical means for weapons production
diffuses, and as the constraining influence of the superpower "parent states" wane.
The impact of nuclear weapons on balancing will be discussed more fully in Chapters
IV and V.
2. Cases
Criteria for case selection included both relevance and rigor. Relevance in the
current case is self-evident. The answers to questions about what actions, if any,
states will take to balance American predominance in the international system may
have far-reaching consequences for the United States and for the system as a whole.
In the historical case, relevance derives from the similarities of that era to the current
one, of which there are several.
Britain had by around 1860 probably "reached its zenith in relative terms,"24
and so faced the re-ordering of its system over the ensuing decades as both the
predominant power of its era and, as hindsight shows, as a power in relative decline.
The United States also has passed its apogee in terms of relative power, although
history has yet to bear out any ultimate decline. 25 Despite that observation, both
24 Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Random
House, 1987. p. 151.
25
1 refer here to the fact that the US share of world economic production is no
longer near the peak values achieved in the decades following the Second World War.
Paul Kennedy show that as late as 1960 the United States still accounted for 26% of
the Gross World Product, while by 1980 this figure had fallen to 21.5%. (Kennedy.
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York: Random House, 1987. p. 436.) As Prof.
John Arquilla has pointed out to me, however, the magnitude of the recent Soviet/
countries are predominantly economic powers, although the US adds unquestionable
military potential to the equation. For Britain in the period in question however
".
. . the size of [its] economy in the world was not reflected in the country's fighting
power. "26 In addition, the power of Great Britain, in many ways like that of the United
States, rested in no small part on "its insular position, . . . industrial and commercial
preeminence, fiscal strength, and an unchallenged and inexpensive paramountcy in
many areas of the world. . . ,"27
Tough testing stems from choosing cases where balancing behavior ought to
be prevalent. In order to meet this test a case was chosen where one power
predominated in the international system, and where the old ordering principle had
been recently abandoned. "A structure," according to Waltz, "is defined by the
arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural change."28
The ordering principle of the current system has changed from bipolarity to one of
multipolarity. The nineteenth century case, while multipolar both before and after the
Crimean War, also underwent a structural change and should show active balancing
behavior as the Concert System, which had governed relations among the great
Russian reverses may have outweighed any U. S. decline, resulting in a relative
increase in U. S. security.
26 Kennedy, 1987. p. 153.
27 Paul Schroeder. "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994). p. 145. Schroeder, however, argues on the
whole against the idea of a British hegemony during this period.
28 Waltz, 1979. p. 80.
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powers for the previous four decades, broke down. It should prove useful to examine
the behavior of states in a historic multipolar structure to predict actions in the
emerging structure.
Limiting the period of the historical study (in addition to making the problem
somewhat more tractable) contributes to this study in part because of the lack of great
power warfare (although there were four wars fought between the great powers in the
period—Franco-Austrian War of 1859, Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Franco-Prussian
War of 1870, Russo-Turkish War of 1877). 29 That is, it is not surprising to observe
states both making preparations for war and forming alliances when a major war is on
the immediate horizon as such a war could threaten the very existence of the state.
Although, as Waltz wrote, "Among states, the state of nature is a state of war,"30 what
states do in the absence of a direct and unmistakable threat to their sovereignty is
perhaps more revealing about the general behavior of states. Avoiding the decades
immediately prior to the First World War should remove the bias which might result
from states acting to balance against imminent threat, rather than simply against
potential ones. Given the reduced danger of superpower conflict following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union conclusions drawn from the nineteenth century should
be revealing. Although violence among and within states has not been curtailed by
the end of the cold war, and may have been in some cases encouraged by it, it is
29 Although Turkey was no longer a great power in 1877 I classify the conflict as
a great power war due to the intervention of the other powers at the Berlin Congress to
prevent Russian control of the Straits.
30
Ibid. p. 102. an idea expressed earlier by Thomas Hobbes.
11
generally accepted that the threat of "great power" war has, for the time being
receded.
Of course, given the length of history and the consequent number of choices
available, one case can hardly serve as an adequate test of the ideas here presented.
The case will, however, provide several "mini-cases" as the reactions of several
states to nineteenth century British predominance will be examined. It is hoped that
they will shed light both on the merits and the faults of what is predicted in the
discussion of the current era.
a. Britain and the European Powers: 1856-1878
To test a theory of balance of power against a case of Europe in the
nineteenth century may at first appear less useful, as the period is sometimes viewed
as being the height of the balance of power. Given that, it should not therefore, not
be surprising to find out that balancing occurs in a balance of power system. For the
purposes of this investigation, however, a period in which there is plenty of balancing
to observe is appropriate. Observing the operation of "balance-of-power theory
during the era of its greatest popularity and most general application"31 will increase
the number of opportunities to see by what means states balanced. Additionally, by
focusing the investigation on the decades following the Crimean War, which event
effectively signalled the end of the Concert System in Europe, the balancing should




among them. As an indication of that sort of balancing behavior, William L. Langer
writes of the period, "Among other preparations statesmen began to devote
themselves more and more to the business of finding allies, and alliances came to be
the accepted thing in international relations. . . . the great coalitions of modern history
were almost always made just before the outbreak of war or during the course of the
conflict itself. There are few instances of alliances which extended over long periods
of years and were based upon written agreements which specified in detail what
should be done in certain contingencies."32 Yet during this period they were being
made.
Secondly, the case is of interest from the perspectives of both historical
investigation and contemporary problems. During the period in question, Great
Britain found itself as both the predominant power in the system and in danger of
losing that position as its relative power eroded. Balancing against a larger power
should be most evident when that power is preponderant, or hegemonic.
Concomitantly, the putative hegemon, were it to perceive its relative decline, would
also be likely to engage in balancing behavior in order to arrest or reverse this decline
as well as to answer the challenge of rising powers. 33
32 William L. Langer. European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890. New
York: Knopf, 1956. pp. 5-6.
33 Robert Gilpin, for instance, suggests that the hegemon's "first and most
attractive option ... is to eliminate the source of the problem" by launching a
preventative war while it still possesses a military advantage. War and Change in World
Politics, p. 191.
13
b. The United States in the Post-Cold War World
The second area of inquiry, focusing on the post-cold war era, while not
providing the advantage of historical perspective is self-evidently rich with relevance.
As it had when the Crimean War ended the effective functioning of the Concert
System, the system which was characterized above all by the bipolarity engendered
by the superpower standoff and which had governed the actions of the states of which
it was made up has undergone a radical change. This restructuring is even more
important than the striving for balances following the breakup of the Concert of
Europe because it more clearly indicates a systemic change. Waltz writes that
"[a]narchic systems are transformed only by changes in organizing principle and by
consequential changes in the number of their principle parties."34 A consequential
change is one where the change in the number of actors significantly changes
expectations about the way they will behave. 35 The international system of states,
despite changes in the actors, had been multipolar from its inception until the end of
the Second World War. Bipolarity then prevailed, bringing in a different set of
assumptions. The eclipse of Soviet power has left the United States as the
predominant power in a world which is once again re-ordering itself with the future
form, whether uni- or multipolar remains unknown. The form of any future system will
be determined by the actions taken by these actors in the coming years. Will the-
United States take steps to consolidate its hegemonic position, or is this indeed




possible? Or will the future see the rise of other "great powers," either as individual
states or in coalition against the predominant power of the United States?
Clausewitz wrote that, "Theory should be study, not doctrine,"36 and it is
in this spirit that this investigation is undertaken. It is not intended to answer specific
policy questions, whether for the United States or any other nation. Nevertheless,
Jervis holds that "We cannot make sense out of our environment without assuming
that, in some sense, the future will resemble the past."37 Therefore it is hoped that this
investigation will ask some pertinent questions and arrive at some conclusions from
the examination of past history which may help guide future policy-makers.
36 Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Trans, and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter
Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Book II, Chapter 2, p. 141.
37 Robert Jervis. Perception and Misperception in International Politics,




A prominent theoretical framework for understanding international relations has
long been that provided by realism, whose basic assumptions are: "(1) states (or city
states) are the key units of action; (2) they seek power, either as an end in itself or as
a means to other ends; and (3) they behave in ways that are, by and large, rational,
and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms."38 While a useful
interpretive framework, "these premises do not, by themselves, constitute the basis for
a science."39 Kenneth Waltz goes far toward bridging that shortcoming with his
development of structural, or neorealism, particularly in his Theory of International
Politics, which "is generally considered a major advance on the classical version of
Hans Morgenthau and others."40 The main proposition of structural realism is that
broad outcomes of international politics can be best understood as resulting from
38 Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 7.
39
Ibid.
40 Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994). p. 108. The standard work of classical
realism is Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: Knopf, 1948). Other neorealist works by Waltz include Man, the State and
War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); "The
Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds.
The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), pp. 39-52; and "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3
(1964), pp. 881-909. Other applications of realist and neorealist theory can be found in
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press,
1987); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Great Britain and
Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981).
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structural constraints imposed on the states by the states system rather than from unit
behavior. 41 A structural approach leads one to different assumptions about the
functioning of the units and the system than those of classical realism, discussed
below. Understanding the nature of the system of which the states are members
leads one to greater understanding of their actions within that system. Structure is
not, of course, the sole determinant of the actions of states in the system. Other
writers have emphasized the primacy of domestic political structures, interests and
institutions in driving security policy. 42 This paper, however, focuses only on the
structural aspects. A review of the main ideas underlying neorealist theory is
necessary to understand the conclusions that it reaches and on which this work is
based.
A. STRUCTURE AND THE STATES SYSTEM
"Most studies that we call 'international relations'," as Robert Jervis notes, "are
really studies of foreign policies, analyzing as they do the causes of an individual
41 Schroeder, 1994. p. 108.
42 A variety of approaches to defense and foreign policymaking have stressed
the importance of domestic factors. This evidence is especially strong in the literature
on bureaucratic politics, pioneered by Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971) and
Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Brookings
institution, 1974.) More recently, a number of writers have examined US defense
policymaking form the standpoint of electoral politics and other American government
perspectives. See Daniel Wirls Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). For another classic assessment of
domestic influences on foreign policy, see James N. Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources
of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967).
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state's actions. There is nothing wrong with this, but focusing upon the international
system and patterns of interaction can be equally illuminating."43 Neorealism is a
systems, or third-image theory. A systems theory, as opposed to a reductionist one,
holds that international-political outcomes are not determined by what states are like
but rather by the constraining and disposing force of the system on the units. 44 Or, as
Robert Powell describes it, "[i]n a situation entailing strategic interdependence, such
as that of the great powers, an actor's optimal strategy depends on the other actors'
strategies."45 The system in question—the international states system—is composed
of both the interacting units, in this case the states, and its structure. The structure, in
turn, is defined by its ordering principle, the functional differentiation or non-
differentiation of the units, and by the distribution of capabilities across the units. 46
Ordering principles can be either anarchical or hierarchical. The ordering
principle of the international system in neorealism is assumed to be that of anarchy 47
43 Robert Jervis, "Systems Theories and Diplomatic History," in Paul Gordon
Lauren, ed. Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy (New York:
Free Press, 1979) p. 212.
44 Waltz, 1979. pp. 61-72.
45 Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-
Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994). p. 315.
46
Waltz, 1979. pp. 100-101.
47 There are, of course, also hierarchy-oriented theories of international
relations. Gilpin suggests a theory of hegemonic transition in War and Change in
World Politics, while others have suggested "long cycles," and "cycles of leadership" as
structural systems. Even in power transition worlds, however, balancing plays an
important role.
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The condition of anarchy is one in which the realm is formally unorganized. That is,
there is an absence of central rule and "[n]o one by virtue of authority is entitled to
command; no one, in turn, is obligated to obey."48 Robert Art and Robert Jervis
expand and clarify the concept by writing that "[s]tates can make commitments and
treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punishes deviations.
This—the absence of a supreme power—is what is meant by the anarchic
environment of international politics."49
The problem with the assumption of anarchy, as Waltz says, is "how to
conceive of an order without an orderer and of organizational effects where formal
organization is lacking."50 It can, however, be done by making an assumption about
the basic motivation of the units within the structure. This basic assumption of
classical realism is that the primary motivation of states is the quest for power in an
absolute sense. Joseph Grieco, however, holds that "[g]iven its understanding of
anarchy, [structural] realism argues that individual well-being is not the key interest of
states; instead, it finds that survival is their core interest."51 Ensuring their own
48 John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," in
Robert 0. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986) p. 134.
49 Robert Art and Robert Jervis. International Politics. (Boston: Little, Brown,
1973) p. 1.
50 Waltz, 1979. p. 89.
51 Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organizations, Vol. 42, No. 3
(Summer 1988), p. 498.
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survival underlies the search for power. Taking that survival as a basic motive leads
to different assumptions being derived. The survival motive is a useful one because it
allows one to then construct a theory which "important consequences" can be
inferred. 52 Survival is also the prerequisite for a state to achieve any other aim which
it might have, and therefore can be seen as the basic motivation. The organizational
effects which derive from the necessity of survival under the condition of anarchy are,
then, self-help and the preference for relative over absolute gains.
B. SELF-HELP
Because there exists no central authority states are required to provide for their
own interests as best they can—the familiar idea of self-help. As Waltz says, "[t]o
achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of
anarchy—be they people, corporations, states, or whatever—must rely on the means
they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves. Self-help is
necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order."53 It may not be clear why this
must be so. If, as Waltz says, ". . . the condition of insecurity—at the least, the
uncertainty of each about the other's future intentions and actions—works against [the
states'] cooperation,"54 how exactly does the structure of the system constrain states
from seeking the mutual benefits could be achieved through cooperation?
52 Waltz, 1979, p. 91.




Although "[njations could mutually enrich themselves by further dividing not just
the labor that goes into the production of goods but also some of the other tasks they
perform, such as political management and military defense, . . . [t]he structure of
international politics limits the cooperation of states in two ways."55 First, "each of the
units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the
means of protecting itself against others."56 Second, "A state also worries lest it
become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of
goods and services."57
That is, lacking the constraint of a central authority, states must first be
concerned with not only their own gains but must sacrifice some absolute economic
gain in deference to relative gains by potential opponents. Additionally, they must
give up some of the benefits of cooperation because specialization may lead to
vulnerabilities such as a dependence on foreign materials or goods. States are thus
reduced to self-help in matters of security. Note especially that these fears do not
arise from any particular set of circumstances, or against another particular state, but








C. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE GAINS
The question of absolute vs. relative gains is an important one for neorealist
theory. Traditional realist theory, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,
holds that the primary motivation of states is the acquisition of power. The natural
extension of this idea is that states will attempt to maximize their power. Neorealism
posits that the quest for survival is the basic motivation of states and that power is
only one of the means of achieving that end; an assumption that would make states
sensitive to relative gains rather than absolute ones. This proposition can be
demonstrated either negatively, by showing that states do not seek to maximize their
power under ordinary conditions, or positively by showing how the question of relative
gains relate to their security.
Robert Keohane states the first (negative) argument best when he writes:
States concerned with self-preservation do not seek to
maximize their power when they are not in danger. On the
contrary, they recognize a trade-off between
aggrandizement and self-preservation; they realize that a
relentless search for universal domination may jeopardize
their own autonomy. They moderate their efforts when
their positions are secure. Conversely, they intensify their
efforts when danger arises, which assumes that they were
not maximizing them under more benign conditions. 58
By simply pointing out that states generally are capable of producing more power,
such as by mobilizing their economies for war, they are de facto not maximizing that
power under normal circumstances.
58 Keohane, 1986. p. 174.
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On the positive side, Waltz states his position directly: "In the anarchy of
international politics relative gain is more important than absolute gain."59 The
structural causes of this superiority are related to their core interest in survival and the
scarcity of security. The foundation of security for a state is the power of that state
relative to that of the others, not the absolute value of that power. As Grieco puts it:
"Driven by an interest in survival, states are acutely sensitive to any erosion of their
relative capabilities, which are the ultimate basis for their security and independence
in an anarchical, self-help international context."60
Robert Jervis reiterates the point:
In international politics it is particularly true that wealth is
not the primary national goal. Not only will states pay a
high price to maintain their security, autonomy, and the
spread of their values, but the calculus of economic benefit
is affected by the international context. While economic
theory argues that the actor should care only about how
the outcome of an economic choice affects him, those who
fear that they may have to fight need to worry about
relative advantage as well as absolute gains61
59 Kenneth N. Waltz. Man, the State, and War. (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1987) p. 198.
60 Grieco, p. 498.
61 Robert Jervis. "The Future of World Politics," International Security, VoL 16,
No. 3 (Winter 1991/92) p. 50. Jervis cites: Waltz, Theory of International Politics;
Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States and the
International Economic Order, International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984),
pp. 355-36; Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40,
No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 334-336; and Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of
Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International
Organizations, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507, among others.
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One cannot simply be happy about a gain in power regardless of the gains of
others, as one could be in the field of economics. The gains of others have far
greater implications in matters of security than simply "keeping up with the Jones's"
In an anarchic world the power of others may be used against you, and only your own
power can prevent that eventuality. If the first's power doubles while the second's
triples, the security position of the first has degraded no matter the size of the
absolute gain.
Anarchic orders commit states to self-help. Given the primacy of security in a
self-help system, what behavior should predominate among states in the international
system? The answer given by structural realism, as stated by Fareed Zakaria, is that
"[t]he logic of competition under anarchy suggests that states, jealous of their
independence, will balance against a rising, threatening great power, rather than jump
on its bandwagon."62 The balancing is the dominant behavior is assumed by
neorealism and it is taken as a given in this paper. 63 Balancing is the action states
take in order to maintain their position in the system. No state can afford to let
62 Fareed Zakaria. "Is Realism Finished?" in The National Interest, No. 30
(Winter 1992/93). p. 23.
63 That assumption is not, however, unchallenged. See John Arquilla, "Balances
without Balancing," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 1992. See also Paul Schroeder,
"Historical Reality vs Neorealist Theory" {International Security, 19:1, Summer 1994,
pp. 108-148); Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning For Profit" {International Security,
19:1, Summer 1994, pp. 72-107); and Thomas J. Christenson and Jack Snyder, "Chain
Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity" {International
Organization, 44:2, Spring 1990, pp. 137-168).
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another actor develop a preponderance of power as such a preponderance is in and
of itself threatening
Balancing behavior is the subject of the next chapter, and the method of
balancing is the subject of Chapter IV. Also in Chapter IV, hypotheses will be
developed about the relative efficacy of internal vs. external balancing behavior.
Before turning to the central issue of balancing, it is probably necessary, however, to
comment on which units of the system which are under consideration.
D. GREATER AND SMALLER POWERS
Although an effective theory encompasses all of the actors within the system,
neorealism focuses on the actions and interactions of the great powers of the era
under consideration. For neorealism, therefore, great powers become the key units of
analysis not, as under classical realism, all the states or city-states. As Waltz puts it,
"[t]he theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great
powers of an era. This is the fashion among political scientists as among historians,
but fashion does not reveal the reason lying behind the habit. In international politics,
as in any self-help system, the units of greatest capability set the scene of action for
others as well as for themselves. In systems theory, structure is a generative notion;
and the structure is generated by the interactions of its principal parts."64 If structure is
64 Waltz, 1979. p. 72. Robert Gilpin also writes that "In every international
system the dominant powers in the international hierarchy of power and prestige
organize and control the processes of interactions among the elements of the system."
War and Change in world Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1981) p. 29.
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in part defined by the distribution of power, and the bulk of that power in concentrated
in a few units, it makes sense to focus on those units in developing theory.
The lesser powers, of course, are not by their limited role in the development of
the theory excluded from its tenets, but given that "the world is a large matrix of
interactions in which most of the entries are very close to zero"65 their impact is not as
relevant as those of the great powers. Great powers, of course, interact with the
lesser powers and "because it has commitments all over the world, a great power is at
least slightly affected by most changes in relations of other states."66 Even if the role
of smaller powers has been somewhat limited they, too, exhibit balancing behavior
and will be considered in the case studies. Because of the presence and probable
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, moreover, the impact of smaller powers
on the international system as a whole is expected to be greater in the current era
than it has historically been.
Rather than enter the argument about what constitutes power here, and who,
therefore is a great power, I will (gratefully) rely on the work of others to determine
which states will receive the focus of my attention. The first case study is that of
Great Britain and the European powers in the period 1856-1878. In that period, six
states receive the appellation of "great power." These are: Austria-Hungary, France,




Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Italy. 67 International influence, in this period, was
"still largely a function of [a state's] military power. But that, more than ever before,
was now in turn a function of its economic maturity and financial strength."68 Hence,
this factors which go into this list are more readily measurable (and consequently
more likely to be agreed upon) and shows the strong influence of the process of
industrialization and the development of international trade.
The second "case"— the United States and the post-cold war world—is not as
simply solved if for no other reason than the concept of power, never easily grasped,
has become all the more elusive. Additionally, as the case is primarily projective,
some states will be considered on the basis of their potential for great power status.
Inclusion of the United States should be unchallenged, but the inclusion of any others
might well be. Waltz considers a list of requirements for great power status which
seems fairly comprehensive, (size of population and territory, resource endowment,
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence) but against
67 Waltz names these six powers in Theory of International Politics, as does
Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. While the positions of the first
five as great powers is generally agreed upon, the inclusion of Italy is less clear. Jack
S. Levy dates Italy's inclusion as a great power from after its unification in 1861 . )War
in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975. Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1983. p. 41.) William Langer, in European Alliances includes Italy, but says
(in reference to the Russo-Turkish conflict of 1877) that "Italy was not a sufficiently
important factor to decide the course of European diplomacy." (p. 122) A. J. P. Taylor
in The Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954)
expresses similar reservations when he admits Italy to the circle of powers in 1861 , but
describes the change as "more nominal than real." (p. xxiii).
68 Matthew S. Anderson. The Ascendancy of Europe (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1972) p. 22.
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whose scrutiny perhaps only the United States would stand up. 69 Yet one could
hardly deny that other great powers exist. For the purposes of this paper I will include
such states as fulfill most of those requirements, even if they are lacking in others.
Such a list of powers would include: Russia, Germany (with or without a United
Europe), Japan, and China. 70 China, it seems, as the state about which the greatest
doubt arises, now takes the place of Italy in the circle as the state which ought to be a
great power, but whose inclusion is problematic. On the basis of its size, population,
expanding economy, nuclear weapons, and its permanent seat on the UN Security
Council, I cannot discount it. Great Britain and France, while not the powers they
once were, still merit consideration much the same reason and will be discussed in
the context of the potential for a united Europe.
69 Waltz, 1979. p. 131.
70
Reflecting the dissension, or confusion, over great power status, each entry
has its proponents and detractors. Waltz, in "the Emerging Structure of World Politics,"
is quite confident about Germany/Europe, Japan and China, but denigrates Russia's
status, pointing out its economic weakness by saying that "great powers do not gain
and retain their rank by excelling in [only] one way or another." (p. 50) Richard
Rosecrance cites three "major centers of power . . . the United States, Russia and the
European Community," leaving out Japan and China and doubting the status of
Germany without the rest of Europe ("A New Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs, Vol.
71, No.2, p. 75). Hedley Bull, in The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia, 1977)
includes the US, USSR and China, but describes Japan and a combination of Western
European powers as "potential . . . great powers." (p. 102). Christopher Layne in "The
Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise," {International Security, Vol. 17, No.
4, pp. 5-51) posits that the United is the only great power left, though he warns of the
rise of others which might include Russia, Germany, Japan and China (p. 5n). Samuel
P. Huntington agrees that the US is the only superpower, but includes the Soviet
Union, Japan, China, Germany, the UK and France as major powers in "America's
Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Jan/Feb 1991), p. 6.
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III. BALANCES AND BALANCING
The premise, as stated in Chapter II, from which I begin is that states, and in
particular great powers, tend to balance against power rather than bandwagon with it.
The logical extension of that argument is that if states balance against power,
overwhelming power should in particular generate balancing behavior. Hegemonic
power should prompt counter-balances. As Waltz says, "[i]n international politics,
overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it." 71 It is not
the intent of this paper to enter the argument about whether the dominant behavior of
states is balancing, bystanding or bandwagoning. Rather, balancing is assumed, and
the dependent variable is how (internally or externally) states balance. This chapter,
in support of that goal, will explore some of the ideas on which the assumption of
balancing is made. Participation in the balancing/bandwagoning/bystanding debate,
for the purposes of this paper, will therefore be limited to an attempt to show the
theoretical grounding and imperatives of balancing behavior and, thereby, its
importance. With balancing thus grounded, the choice of type of balancing behavior
can be usefully pursued.
Before proceeding, some discussion of the term "balance of power" is
necessary in order to define what is meant by balancing behavior. Inis Claude
provides an excellent starting point for such a discussion. The term balance of power,
71 Kenneth N. Waltz, "America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy
Perspective, " PS, December 1991, p. 669. Quoted in Christopher Layne, "The
Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No.
4 (Spring 1993) p. 7.
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as already noted, suffers from a plethora of definitions which, rather than clarifying,
have served to obfuscate its meaning. For Claude, the varied definitions of balance
of power can be separated into essentially three categories which he describes as
balance of power as a situation, balance of power as a policy, and balance of power
as a system. 72 As a situation, balance of power is a descriptive term referring to an
equilibrium (or lack thereof) of power between states or groups of states. As a policy
it refers to the active attempt of states either to create or maintain such an equilibrium.
As will be explained, below, neither of these usages is adequate from the perspective
of developing useful structural theory. It is balance of power as a system, that is "a
certain arrangement of the operation of international relations in a world of many
states,"
73
that is under consideration.
When viewed as a system of international relations balance of power seeks to
explain "the results of states' actions, under given conditions, and those results may
not be foreshadowed in any of the actors' motives or be contained as the objectives of
their policies."74 The particular result which it seeks to explain is that recurrent
formation of balances of power. Were balance of power limited to its descriptive
function it would have no explanatory power. Either the system would be balanced, or
it would not be.
72
Inis Claude. Power and International Relations. (New York: Random House,
1962) pp. 13-25.
73 Claude, p. 20.
74 Waltz, 1979. p. 118.
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Similarly, balance of power when viewed as a policy again offers little system-
wide explanatory power. On the level of foreign policy, as it is, balance of power
would be a second image theory which due to the ecological fallacy cannot provide
third-image explanations. This is not to say that states could not choose, or have not
chosen, the maintenance of a balance of power as a principle with which to guide
their foreign policies. Such a policy is sometimes associated with those of Great
Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 75 Such a policy is not necessary,
however, for balances to occur. If it were, it would indeed be difficult to account for
the historical recurrence of balances in the absence of such policies. If balances
occur without the intent of the units within the system, there must be a reason beyond
a second-image explanation.
It is only on the systemic level that balance of power can provide the
explanatory power necessary for an international relations theory. An important
concept of this theory should be reiterated: states do not have to act in order to
produce the balance, the balance occurs as a result of the actions of states seeking
to ensure their survival in an anarchic system. The action taken by states is to
preserve their independence by providing for their security, under classical realism it
was power which was the end toward which "rational" statesmen strove. Under
neorealism power is a "possibly useful means" and therefore "sensible statesmen try
to have an appropriate amount of it. In crucial situations, however, the ultimate
75
Waltz, 1979. p. 164.
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concern of states is not for power but for security."76 It is not necessary for a state to
pursue a policy aimed at preserving an equilibrium of power for a balance to result,
merely for it to pursue its primary goal of security.
Unintended consequences can result from the policies of individuals within a
structure. Waltz offers several examples, one of which is related here:
If one expects others to make a run on a bank, one's
prudent course is to run faster than they do even while
knowing that if few others run, the bank will remain solvent,
and if many run, it will fail. In such cases, pursuit of
individual interest produces collective results that nobody
wants, yet individuals by behaving differently will hurt
themselves without altering outcomes. 77
Similarly, the pursuit of power as an end can in fact have negative consequences if
balancing is the predominant behavior of states. "Excessive strength may prompt
other states to increase their arms and pool their efforts against the dominant state."78
Thus individual units in attempting to create a preponderance of power generate
instead a balance.
If balance of power must be more than a descriptive term, and if balances do
not necessarily derive from the policies of states, then balancing must result from
structural causes. This statement must, to a degree, be qualified. John Ikenberry
notes, correctly, that "structure is not, strictly speaking, a source of causation. The
76 Kenneth N. Waltz. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I.
Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 40.
77
Waltz, 1979. pp. 107-108.
78 Waltz, 1989. p. 40.
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structures provide limits on and possibilities for state action; the state's interests
themselves are not determined by structure. They emerge through the interplay of a
state elite that is adapting and strategizing in the context of those structures. More
precisely, the formal interests of states stem from the obdurate organizational
predicament of the state's geopolitical and spatial position." 79 Structure, then, does
not directly cause action on the part of the states, but its constraints provide limits on
the actions which can be taken. Those limits or constraints are what determine that
the actions of states will result in balances forming. The constraints, as mentioned in
Chapter II, imposed by the system are those of anarchy and self-help.
Two additional concepts need to be introduced before proceeding in order to
further undergird the concept of balancing behavior. These concepts will also be
used for the discussion of internal vs. external balancing in Chapter IV. These
concepts are the security dilemma and the concept of collective goods.
A. THE SECURITY DILEMMA
The security dilemma, simply stated, is that "many of the means by which a
state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others."80 This dilemma
arises from the anarchic nature of the international system, and accounts for the
scarcity of security in it for "even when no state has any desire to attack others, none
79
G. John Ikenberry. "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment,"
World Politics. Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1986) p. 66.
80 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol.
30, No. 2 (January 1978) p. 169.
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can be sure that others' intentions are peaceful, or will remain so. . . "81 Even among
allies, it must always be borne in mind that "[m]inds can be changed, new leaders can
come to power, values can shift, [and] new opportunities and dangers can arise."82
States therefore find themselves in a quandary. Efforts to increase their
security lead at best to the same lack of security which it faced before and at worst to
a decrease in its security if the other states take measures which exceed those of the
first. "Individually," then, "states may only be doing what they can to bolster their
security. Their individual intentions aside, collectively their actions yield arms races
and alliances."83
At first blush, the security dilemma seems to refute the notion of balancing by
suggesting that the game of security is one which cannot be won. If what one state
sees as balancing is deemed a danger to a second, that state will respond. The
response of the second, however will be threatening to the first, thus setting off a
spiralling arms race. In fact, the security dilemma does not preclude balancing. If
"winning" is problematic in international relations, losing can all but be assured.
States that choose not to compete, as they are free to do, will fall behind those that do
compete and eventually face the danger of elimination. This is the result of the
emulation of the successful states by those "competitors". As explained by Waltz "[i]f
81 Glenn H. Snyder. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics.
Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984) p. 461.
82
Jervis, 1978. p. 105.
83 Waltz, 1989. p. 43.
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some [who do choose to compete] do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall
by the wayside. Obviously, the system won't work if all states lose interest in
preserving themselves. It will, however, continue to work if some states do."84 States
must therefore either compete or lose.
B. COLLECTIVE GOODS
The concept of collective goods also contributes to an understanding of how
states will balance and which states are more likely to choose one behavior over the
other. "Collective goods," by way of definition, "are those that, if acquired, benefit
everyone whether or not he has contributed to their acquisition."85 A frequently given
example is that of national defense. "If the nation is defended, everyone is defended,
whether or not he has paid his taxes. 86 Each person reaps the benefit of that defense,
while only some have to bear the cost.
The concept of collective goods offers another example of the unintended
consequences of individual rationality. Robert Jervis writes:
If the hegemon is defeated, all states benefit, whether or
not they participated in the coalition. Since joining the
84 Waltz, 1979. p. 118.
85 Robert Jervis. "Systems Theories and Diplomatic History," in Paul Gordon
Lauren, ed. Diplomacy. (New York: Free Press, 1979) p. 216.
86
Ibid. p. 222. Michael Mandelbaum offers the same example, along with others
in the Fate of Nations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 355. For an
in depth discussion of collective goods and international relations, see also Jeffrey A.
Hart and Peter F. Cowhey, "Theories of Collective Goods Reexamined," Western
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coalition is costly, the state's first choice would be to have
the hegemon defeated without having to join in the
opposition. In other words, the state would like to be the
'free rider,' taking advantage of the efforts of others. But
since this is true of each of the states, there is a danger
that no one will oppose the hegemon, even though all want
it stopped. 87
This concept not only applies in the actions of a state when faced with the threat of a
hegemonic power, but in the international system in general. Since no individual state
wants to bear the burden of providing security for others, the scarcity of security is
worsened.
More importantly, the concept of collective goods provides a further insight into
which states are likely to balance internally. Only great powers are capable of great
tasks, and only great powers have system wide responsibilities. Great powers should,
therefore, exhibit greater tendencies to balance internally since they have both more
to lose and greater ability to affect the outcome. This also leads to the opposite
conclusion about smaller powers, drawn by Jervis, that "[s]ince the participation of
small states makes less of a difference in the outcome than does the participation of
larger states, we would expect them to follow balance-of-power prescriptions less
frequently and to be more subject to domino dynamics than are the larger powers."88
87





States do not, of course, have to balance although neorealism holds that they
do. Recall that the international system is an anarchic, competitive, self-help system,
and that the primary motivation of states is survival—a motivation which manifests
itself as the quest for security and the sublimation of all other goals, such as the
acquisition of power in the absolute rather than relative sense, to that quest. Waltz
argues that "Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the
weaker of two coalitions."89 As discussed above, gains in power can result in
unintended negative consequences. As Waltz points out, "[i]n international politics,
success leads to failure. The excessive accumulation of power by one state or
coalition elicits the opposition of others."90 Thus if a state joins the bandwagon of a
rising power it would only exacerbate the condition which will provoke a counter-
coalition.
To illustrate the point, Waltz offers the evidence of the break up of war-winning
coalitions. States seeking to maximize power would, if bandwagoning held, remain
combined in order to "increase the extent of their power over others."91 Instead, we
see the victors "squaring] off and look[ing] for allies who might help them."92 For
89 Waltz, 1979. p. 126.
90 Kenneth N. Waltz. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert
Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds. The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 49.
91




example, "Almost as soon as their [World War II] wartime alliance ended, the United
States and the Soviet Union found themselves locked in a cold war."93
In one argument for bandwagoning behavior, Randall Schweller holds that
"[t]he aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already
possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self extension: to obtain values
coveted. Simply put, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning
by the opportunity for gain." 94 Although he posits that bandwagoning is not the
antithesis of balancing but rather a viable strategy for a revisionist rather than a status
quo power, his conclusion can be countered. While a state may receive short-term
benefits from bandwagoning, the long term effects are deleterious. For, as Stephen
Walt notes, "To ally with the dominant power means placing one's trust in its
continued benevolence."95 By contributing to the increasing power of its ally, the
bandwagoner has only worsened his own security position.
Also, even if a revisionist state should succeed in making whatever gain it
achieved, it would not long remain a revisionist state, but would become instead a
status quo power. The exigency of emulation will overcome them and they will be
socialized into the system. The constraints of the system will compel them begin to
behave in the manner of those states which have in the past been successful. Waltz
93
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offers the example of the Soviet Union, which was once a revisionist state, but upon
achieving great power status was compelled to compete according to the "rules of the
game .
Stephen M. Walt writes that "The proposition that states will join alliances in
order to avoid domination by stronger powers lies at the heart of traditional balance of
power theory."97 Alliance, however, involves costs in the form of constraints on the
actions of the partners to the agreement. Concessions of sovereignty also cut against
the primary goal of preserving one's independence. As for seeking guarantees of
safety, a state should bear in mind that there are no guarantees.
According to Zakaria, "While realists debate how strong systemic influences
are on state's foreign policies, most agree that in crises and in the long run they tend
to dominate other factors."98 Those systemic influences suggest "that states, jealous
of their independence, will balance against a rising, threatening great power, rather
than jump on its bandwagon."99 The theoretical grounding of these assumptions,
while perhaps not unchallengeable, seem firm enough to proceed. Balancing is an
appropriate option for states in an anarchic system which offers them long-term
protection of their primary interests. Whether states balance by internal means
96 Waltz, 1979. pp. 127-128. For his discussion of the socialization effect see
pp. 74-77.
97 Stephen M. Walt. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,"






(increasing their own economic or military capability) or through external means
(enlarging or strengthening one's own alliance or weakening the opposing one)
remains an open question. The preference for one type or the other "emerge[s] in
the struggle to find ways for the state to assert itself in the adjustment process," 100 and




IV. INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL BALANCING
Accepting, then, the premise that balancing is the theoretically most likely
behavior, the main question of this work arises: How do states they balance? Or,
more precisely, given a range of options for balancing, which option[s] should a state
choose? Realism hold that states " are unitary actors who, at a minimum seek their
own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. States, or those
who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in
order to achieve the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories: internal
efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to
develop clever strategies ) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge
one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one)." 101 Although
neorealism is clear in predicting balancing, it is not clear in predicting which behavior
should predominate.
Waltz does, of course, discuss balancing, although the nature of that balancing
is at best a secondary issue. Where it is discussed, it is in the context of the different
nature of balancing between bipolar and multipolar systems, rather than as a stand-
alone concept. The nature of this balancing would seem to have relevance, however,
in a complete theory of international relations. Will balancing result in the formation of
new alliances and/or the disruption or break up of current ones, or will it primarily be
in the form of the development of internal capabilities? These are questions which
101
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deserve answers, and whose answers could prove to be important determinants of
policy for the units in the system.
It should perhaps be reiterated that predictions of by balancing behavior are
not to be confused with attainment of power equivalences between the states. As
Ruggie points out, "the theory predicts balancing, not balances, of power, where
balances are defined as equivalences. Whether actual balances form, and even more
whether any specific configuration or alignment forms, will only in part be determined
by positional factors; it will also depend upon information and transaction costs, and a
host of unit-level attributes." 102 That states will take actions that attempt to balance
predominant power is what is predicted, not that they can succeed in doing so or that
any such "success" is even necessary for the validity of the theory.
A. BALANCING: BIPOLAR AND MULTIPOLAR WORLDS
For Waltz, the type of balancing which predominates turns only on the polarity
of the system. He notes, correctly, that "[balancing is differently done in multi- and
bipolar systems. . . .Where two powers contend, imbalances can be righted only by
their internal efforts. With more than two, shifts in alignment provide an additional
means of adjustment, adding flexibility to the system." 103 Maintaining that internal
means are the only ones available in a bipolar world does not however preclude their
102 John Gerard Ruggie. "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity:
Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," Neorealism and Its Critics. Robert Keohane, ed.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 137.
103 Waltz, 1979. p. 163.
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application in a multipolar one. Although Waltz does not say so directly, the
implication of the omission of discussion of internal balance in a multipolar system is
that external means will, or should predominate.
The international system has, after all, been multi-polar for the majority of its
existence. The bipolarity associated with the cold war has thus far been the only
example of bipolarity, and it has come to an end. 104 That Waltz developed his theory
during the bipolar moment may explain the lacuna. Balancing behavior in a bipolar
world was so strongly constrained by the structure that external balancing was
essentially eliminated. In a multipolar world, however, external balancing has
pertinence again. The theory therefore requires elucidation on this point.
Multipolar systems, of course, possess some different characteristics than
bipolar ones. As Waltz describes them, "[interdependence of parties, diffusion of
dangers, confusion of responses: These are the characteristics of great-power politics
in a multipolar world. Self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about
who has to face them: These are the characteristics of great-power politics in a
104 Waltz maintains, however, that "bipolarity endures, but in an altered state.
Bipolarity continues because militarily Russia can take care of itself and because no
other great powers have yet emerged" ("The Emerging Structure of International
Politics," p. 52). Others would disagree, although there is a general uncertainty about
the polarity of the system. Samuel Huntington describes the world as "uni-multipolar,"
with the United States as the only superpower, but with six other major powers present
("America's Changing Strategic Interests," p. 6). Christopher Layne characterizes the
system as unipolar, but predicts the rise of other great powers ("The Unipolar Illusion").
Robert Jervis raises, but does not answer, the question. "Is it unipolar because the
United States is so much stronger than the nearest competitor, bipolar because of the
distribution of military resources, tripolar because of an emerging united Europe, or
multipolar because of the general dispersion of power?" ("The Future of World
Politics," pp. 41-2.)
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bipolar world." 105 Some characteristics of the international system and its units have
not and do not, however, change with a change in polarity. These are the anarchic
nature of the international system, and the basic motivation of the states for security
and survival. Could these abiding characteristics not influence states to favor internal
balancing in a multipolar situation as well as in a bipolar one? Systemic factors still
act to constrain the behavior of states. It remains to be seen whether those
constraints will act to favor internal balancing in a multipolar world as they did in a
bipolar one.
Before proceeding it is necessary to mention the impact of nuclear weapons on
balancing. While obviously not a factor in historical analyses, their existence and
potential proliferation spread may have a significant impact on the future behavior of
states. The impact of nuclear weapons in a systems theory is somewhat problematic.
It may be unclear how it is that "the introduction of nuclear weapons, a unit-level
change [has] a system-level effect."106 If, however, "the structure of a system changes
with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system's units," 107 the
addition of a significant capability within a unit results in a structural change. 108
105 Waltz, 1989. p. 48.
106 Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the
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Nuclear weapons do represent a significant capability, which Waltz addresses.
According to Waltz "[n]uclear weapons are not relative but absolute weapons." 109 The
impact of these weapons on a state's balancing choices will be discussed in the
hypotheses, but it is worth noting that Waltz assesses their impact when he notes that
"[m]ultipolanty abolishes the stark symmetry and pleasing simplicity of bipolanty, but
nuclear weapons restore both of those qualities to a considerable extent." 110
B. INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL BALANCING
Based on the foregoing discussion hypotheses have been developed
concerning the propensity of states to balance internally or externally; three favoring
either side of the argument. They are presented below in toto. The hypotheses will
be considered (in opposing pairs) in light of relevant theory in an effort to answer the
broader question of whether states are likely to pursue one method or the other.
Waltz suggests the superiority of internal balancing in Theory of International Politics
when he writes that "[i]ntemal balancing is more reliable and precise than external
balancing." 111 By examining each of my hypotheses I hope to both systematize that
superiority and demonstrate its applicability to multipolar as well as bipolar systems.
109
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The cost of alliance, in uncertainty (abandonment and/or entrapment) and in
loss of sovereignty, will cause states to prefer internal balancing.
2. In the current period, and in the future, the availability of nuclear weapons
will favor internal over external balancing.
3. The greater the power of state relative to the predominant power, the more
likely it is to balance internally rather than externally.
4. The lower economic cost of alliance versus military expenditure will favor
external balancing over internal.
5. The potential negative consequences of the acquisition of nuclear weapons
will cause states to rely on external, rather than internal balancing.
6. The smaller the power of the balancing state relative to the hegemon, the
more likely it is to balance externally rather than internally.
1. Hypotheses One and Four
1. The cost of alliance, in uncertainty (abandonment
and/or entrapment) and in loss of sovereignty, will cause
states to prefer internal balancing.
4. The lower economic cost of alliance versus military
expenditure will favor external balancing over internal.
External balancing, for the purposes of this discussion means the seeking of
alliances or the attempt to weaken an opposing alliance. I make no attempt to •
develop an alliance theory, but will make use of the work of others in order to develop
the idea that the long-term risks of alignment outweigh the potential benefits. Those
risks arise from uncertainty and loss of sovereignty.
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Alliance is defined by Stephen Walt as "a formal or informal relationship of
security cooperation between two or more sovereign states This definition assumes
some level of commitment and an exchange of benefits for both parties; severing the
relationship or failing to honor the agreement would presumably cost something, even
if it were compensated in other ways." 112 Alliance formation is not, and cannot be as
straightforward as Walt's definition suggests in an anarchic world. States enter into
such agreements from different relative power standings, which implies unequal costs
and benefits, and with no guarantee that an alliance partner will live up to its bargain.
Under multipolarity alignment becomes an option which was not available
under bipolarity. The option of alignment implies a certain freedom, or flexibility in
choosing alliance partners. That flexibility, however "means both that the country one
is wooing may prefer another suitor and that one's present alliance partner may
defect. Flexibility of alignment narrows one's choice of policies. A state's strategy
must please a potential or satisfy a present partner." 113
The necessity of pleasing potential or satisfying present partners leads one to
the following conclusion: "A state which has no choice but to ally itself with another
cannot exact much of a price for its commitment." 114 If a state has no alternative, the
benefits it receives will consequently be lower, and/or the price it must pay will be
higher. Its policy choices will be limited to those which satisfy potential alliance •
112 Walt, 1987. p. 1 note.




partners. This limitation is necessarily a limitation or infringement on the sovereignty
of that state. Jervis offers the following example:
A state trying to rally others to a coalition against what it
perceives to be a grave menace faces a dilemma. In order
to persuade others to join, the state will want to stress the
danger that the adversary constitutes to them all and its
commitment to the common defense. But to do this is to
acknowledge that it believes it imperative to form an
alliance, thus allowing others who are, or pretend to be,
less alarmed to exact a higher price for their
cooperation. 115
Aside from the potential cost of entering an alliance, "Bargaining among more
than two parties is difficult. Bargainers worry about points at issue. With more than
two parties, each also worries about how the strength of his position will be affected
by combinations he and others may make. If two of the several parties strike an
agreement, moreover, they must wonder if the agreement will be disrupted or negated
by the action of others." 116 Not only do states have to be concerned with outside
parties disrupting an alliance, they must also be concerned with the potential that their
alliance partners with abandon them.
Abandonment can take two forms. First, a partner may simply defect, leaving a
state in the lurch as it were. More dangerously, an alliance partner could fail to live
up to its word in the event of a conflict. Such "[f]ears that allies might defect (perhaps
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anarchic international system," 117 as Glenn H. Snyder points out. He goes on to say
that "States in a multi-polar system,
. . .
,
may lack confidence of being supported if
attacked because the strategic interests of other states are ambiguous." 118
The concomitant alliance problem is that of entrapment. An alliance may
commit a state to a policy which it might not have otherwise pursued, such as entering
into a war. Although the junior partner in an alliance could be the initiator of such an
action (emboldened by the major partner's support) "[i]n general, entrapment is a
more serious concern for the lesser allies than for [a superpower] because they share
only a portion of the latter's global interests, because the superpowers have a much
greater capacity for taking initiatives . . . and because the allies' capacity to restrain
the superpowers is much smaller than vice versa." 119 The mutual dependence which
results from alliances is fraught with dangers, and, as John Ruggie writes, "remains
problematic and therefore is a source of vulnerability to states." 120
Some states may choose to accept these costs as being less than the
economic cost of providing for its own defense, and some states may have little
choice. At the height of the Second World War, the United States spent nearly forty-
117 Glenn H. Snyder. "Alliances, Balance and Stability," International
Organization. Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 124.
118 Glenn H. Snyder, 1 991 . p. 1 27.
119 Glenn H. Snyder. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics.
Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), p. 484.
120
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two percent of its GNP on defense 121 If such a figure were sustainable (a doubtful
prospect at best), only seven other countries in 1991 could have matched the defense
expenditure of the United States. Using the United States as a target is, of course,
absurd, but even if the target country was a medium power such as Canada, only fifty-
five countries could hope to match its expenditure. At a more reasonable (but
probably still unreasonable) defense spending level of twenty percent of GNP, that list
contains only thirty-nine countries, and at ten percent, twenty-five. 122 Such costs
could make even those states which could afford such an expenditure balk. Alliance
provides a means to achieve greater defense at lower cost.
Any alliance, however, increases the already significant uncertainty in the
international system. As Waltz points out, "[sjtates are less likely to misjudge their
relative strengths than they are to misjudge the strength and reliability of opposing
coalitions." 123 Stephen Van Evera provides an example of the uncertainty which
inheres in coalition when he notes that "the greater complexity of multipolarity
increase the possibility that defending states will underestimate how much effort is
necessary to balance against aggressors, and will therefore do too little or act too
late. This can happen if defending states exaggerate the willingness of other
121 $87.4 billion out of a GNP of $210.1 billion. Historical Statistics of the United
States, Colonial Times to 1970 (U. S. Census Bureau, 1975).
122
Military expenditure and GNP data from World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, 1991-1992. (Washington, D. C: U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1991).
123 Waltz, 1979. p. 168.
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defenders to balance, and fail to make military preparations of their own adequate to
compensate for this unwillingness." 124
A state in imminent danger, or without the means to provide for its own
defense, may, however, have no other choice than to enter into an alignment with
another. No other choice, that is, than extinction. The Pollyanna prescription for such
a state is not to find oneself in that position Such a statement in and of itself is of
course of little value, but it has an underlying truth. States which are self-reliant in
matters of security are in a better position than those which are not. While not all
states can be self-reliant, those in a position to achieve self-reliance have incentives
for doing so. Alliances can be effective in meeting short-term security needs.
"Alliances, however," as Organski and Kugler point out, "cannot in the long run alter
secular trends."125
2. Hypotheses Two and Five
2. In the current penod and in the future the availability of
nuclear weapons will favor internal over external balancing.
5. The potential negative consequences of the acquisition
of nuclear weapons will cause states to rely on external,
rather than internal balancing.
124 Stephen Van Evera, "Primed For Peace: Europe After the Cold War,"
International Secuhty. Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), p. 35.
125 Organski, A. F. K. and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 27.
53
Nuclear weapons have a significant effect on the ability of states to balance, as
well as having an alliance inhibiting function. As their acquisition and employment are
internal means the presence of nuclear weapons, and their probable proliferation, will
therefore favor internal balancing among those states which possess them as well as
those which desire them. Waltz and others have discussed this point extensively. 126
The main arguments are presented, below.
The first way in which nuclear weapons affect balancing is by increasing the
potential costs of war with a nuclear-armed power. As Waltz posits "in weighing the
chances of peace, the first questions to ask are questions about the ends for which
states use force and about the strategies and weapons they employ. . . . War
becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to the possible gains." 127
Balances are easier to achieve, and more certain, if a power has nuclear weapons
because few would doubt the costs of a potential conflict.
That is all well and good for nuclear powers, but where does that leave lesser
ones? It leaves them desiring nuclear weapons because "In a nuclear world, . . .
,
the
connection between a country's economic and technological capability, on the one
126 See especially Waltz The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.
Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981. For
similar views, see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace," International Security, Vol.
10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142; and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future:
Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer
1990), pp. 5-56.
127 Waltz, 1989. p. 48.
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hand, and its military capability, on the other, is loosened." 128 Whereas the size of a
country's population and its economic base were once the primary determinants of its
war-fighting capability, much smaller states can now achieve a greater degree of
security with more limited resources and at smaller expense. In fact, Waltz holds that
"Because nuclear weapons alter the relation between economic capability and military
power, a country with well less than half of the economic capability of the leading
producer can easily compete militarily if it adopts a status-quo policy and a deterrent
strategy. Conversely, the leading country cannot use its economic superiority
to establish military dominance, or to gain strategic advantage, over its great power
rivals."
129
The cost effectiveness of nuclear weapons has another important result. By
providing powerful deterrents at limited expense, they allow a countries to
"concentrate attention on their economies rather than on their military forces," 130 and
therefore provide them with additional means to achieve an internal balance.
In addition to the cost effectiveness of nuclear weapons, Waltz also holds that
they inhibit the formation of alliances. As he points out: "Nuclear forces do not add
up. The technology of warheads, of delivery vehicles, of detection and surveillance
devices, of command and control systems, counts more than the size of forces.






Combining separate national forces is not much help." 131 That is, once a certain level
of force is attained (taken to be secure second strike capability), additional force does
not significantly alter the balance achieved, thus obviating the need for alliance.
De Gaulle, it seems, may have been correct. 132
One criticism that has been applied to neorealist theory in general, and which
would therefore apply to this work, is that it relies on rationality and rational decision-
making more than Waltz or other neorealists might suggest. Keohane, for instance,
writes that "The desire for self-preservation makes states that are behind in a struggle
for power try harder, according to Waltz and leads states allied to a potential
hegemon to switch coalitions in order to construct balances of power. Neither of
these processes on which Waltz relies to maintain a balance—intensified effort by the
weaker country in a bipolar system and coalition formation against potentially
dominant states in a multipolar system—could operate reliably without this
motivation."133
This criticism needs to answered, and its answer contributes to the idea that
the proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely. Waltz contends correctly that states are
above all interested in self preservation—the basic function of the state. States that
131 Waltz, 1979. pp. 181-182.
132 Waltz, 1981 . p. 3. In reference to French withdrawal from NATO's unified
military command de Gaulle often said that the force de frappe made alliances
obsolete. Wilfrid Kohl quotes de Gaulle as saying that France "is equipping herself
with atomic armament, the very nature of which precludes her integration [in NATO]."
French Nuclear Diplomacy. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 253.
133 Keohane, 1986. p. 173.
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don't regard this interest will simply be eliminated, regarding this interest is imitative of
states which succeed. 134 That is, some states will necessarily be more successful in
the international system to the detriment of the others. The success of those actors
will cause the other actors to imitate those successful policies. Thus even allies of the
United States (Britain and France) have taken steps to develop their own strategic
weapons, imitating the success of their alliance partner. This imitative effect will also
contribute to the probable acquisition of nuclear weapons by other potential great
powers, with all the effects that such acquisitions entail.
3. Hypotheses Three and Six
3. The greater the power of state relative to the
predominant power, the more likely it is to balance
internally rather than externally.
6. The smaller the power of the balancing state relative to
the hegemon, the more likely it is to balance externally
rather than internally.
The third hypothesis pair in some ways builds on those which precede it. If
internal balancing is more certain than external balance, and entails less cost, those
states which can successfully balance internally should. In order for a state to
balance successfully, it must be able to develop an amount of power which, compared
to that of the state which it is balancing against, is significant. Those states would
logically be the greater powers in the system. The greater the potential threat, or the
134
Waltz, 1979. p. 118.
57
greater the capability of the hegemon (recalling that the security dilemma holds that
threat inheres in capability) the less the relative power of the other actors.
Small powers may have little choice but to enter into alignments as a means for
ensuring their security, even if internal balancing is a superior method. As Ikenberry
notes "[t]he preference function predicts what states will seek to achieve; structural
constraints will determine what is possible." 135 Large powers, however have options
that smaller powers do not. Jervis, in reference to alliance choices, holds that "a
state's bargaining power is determined largely by the availability of alternatives rather
than by its economic and military resources or its contributions to the common
cause."
136 The ability to eschew alliances altogether would, however, seem to be a
significant alternative which is determined by a states resources. That the costs (loss
of sovereignty, abandonment, entrapment) inherent in alliance are costs that a state
with such an option would prefer not to pay seems logical. Glenn Snyder comes to
much the same conclusion when he writes that "a multipolar system structure in which
capabilities are distributed evenly does not by itself imply any alignments." 137 This is
due in part to the hope that others may provide the collective good of standing up to a
potential aggressor as well as the desire not to contribute to the security of others by
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capabilities evenly distributed is more closely approximated by states whose power is
more nearly equal relative to the hegemon.
As an additional factor, in some ways the hegemon itself provides the means
for internal balancing against it. As Waltz describes it the "sameness effect" is
caused by competition among the states which "produces a tendency toward the
sameness of the competitors." 139 The weapons and strategies of the more successful
states are emulated by their challengers so that they "begin to look much the same all
over the world."
140
Gilpin supports that contention in War and Change in World
Politics when he writes that "there is a historical tendency for the military and
economic techniques of the dominant state or empire to be diffused to other states in
the system or, more especially, to states on the periphery of the international system
in question. That is to say, through a process of diffusion to other states, the
dominant power loses the advantage on which its political, military, or economic
success has been based." 141 A single example may serve to illustrate this point.
John Lewis Gaddis, in referring to the recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, points out that:
It was Iraq's integration into the international market in
sophisticated military technology that made it possible for
Saddam Hussein to perform this act of aggression. His
arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, to say nothing
of his surface-to-air-missiles, Scuds, Mirages, the nuclear
weapons he probably would have had if the Israelis had
139 Waltz, 1979. p. 127. Christopher Layne uses the term "sameness effect" in
"Unipolar Illusion," p. 21.
140 Waltz, 1979. p. 127.
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not bombed his reactor in 1981 and the long-range artillery
he certainly would have had if the British had not become
suspicious of his orders for very thick "oil pipes" early in
1990—all of this hardware was not forged by ingenious
Iraqi craftsmen, working tirelessly along the banks of the
Euphrates. Saddam obtained it, rather, by exploiting an
important consequence of integration, which is the inability
or unwillingness of highly industrialized states to control
what their own entrepreneurs, even those involved in the
sale of lethal commodities, do to turn a profit. 142
Several factors seem to favor internal over external balancing, particularly for
the larger powers, and it is the larger powers which "set the scene of action for others
as well as for themselves." 143 In particular, the costs associated with alliance
formation in terms of loss of sovereignty, as well as the dangers of abandonment and
entrapment should favor internal balancing for those who can accomplish it. The
presence of nuclear weapons expands the list of powers that can. Mutual
dependence in an anarchic world is problematic at best. The security dilemma and
flexibility of alignment both work to ensure that the capabilities of today's alliance
partner carry an inherent threat for tomorrow. Faced with short-term threats, or
hegemons of such relative power that a state's very existence is threatened, however,
states may have little choice but to seek alliances in order to provide for their security.
In the quest for that security, one will see that "[s]tates accumulate power in
many ways; the most prominent methods are by armament, territorial aggrandizement,
142 John Lewis Gaddis. "Toward the Post-Cold War World," Foreign Affairs. Vol.
70, No. 2 (Spring 1 991 ), pp. 110-111.
143 Waltz, 1979. p. 72.
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and alliance formation." 144 Before concluding that internal balancing is indeed, in the
long-term a superior choice, it is necessary to test that idea against a case study.




A. THE CASE FOR THE CASES
In order to test the hypotheses generated in Chapter IV, a case study is
employed. The choice of the case was guided by the desire to provide a rigorous test
as well as by its relevance to the current international system. If states are going to
balance, that is, if balancing behavior is to be prominently displayed, that behavior
should be most pronounced in the presence of a dominant power or hegemon. It
follows that if states balance, they will be more likely to balance when the threat is
greatest. They are also most likely to balance in an international system
characterized by uncertainty. The case selected was that of Great Britain and the
European States System in the decades following the Crimean War, specifically the
period from 1856-1878. The conclusions drawn from that case will be used in an
attempt to analyze the current situation and predict the possible future character of
the international system.
When choosing comparative cases, one must either choose cases which
elucidate a common point due to their similarities, or due to their differences. In this
work, the nineteenth century case has been chosen primarily for its similarity to the
current international situation. In both cases, there exist several states which could
be one characterized as great powers, and a single state which was predominant. It
is generally accepted that in the late nineteenth century there existed five or six great
powers—Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria (after 1867 Austria-Hungary), France
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and Italy (after 1861)— at the core in the European states system 145 Similarly, in the
post-cold war era, there exists an unquestioned great, or super, power—the United
States—and a similar array of significant powers which includes Russia, Germany
with or without a united Europe, Japan and China. 146 Despite the diffusion of power
across the system, however, in both cases a single power was the predominant one.
The predominant power in the decades following the Crimean War was Great Britain
and in the current international system it is the United States. A hegemonic power, it
is predicted, should be the one against which balancing is most likely to occur.
Also, in both cases, the international system was in a state of flux. In the
historic case, this flux was generated by the end of the Concert system which had
governed European affairs since 1815. As Michael Mandelbaum put it, "If the Concert
of Europe can be said to have begun at the Congress of Vienna, the Crimean War of
1854-6 marked its end, at least as a set of quasi-formal procedures that the great
powers felt some ongoing obligation to follow." 147 Now the state of flux in the system
145 On great powers and the status of Italy see note 67, Chapter II.
146 Current great powers are discussed in note 70, Chapter II.
147 Michael Mandelbaum, The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988), p. 26. Others share his view. Norman Rich writes that "The most permanent
result of the Crimean War was the disruption of the Concert of Europe," in Why the
Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England,
1985), p. 199. Matthew S. Anderson writes of the conflict that "it was this struggle far
more than the spectacular upheavals of 1848 which ended the Europe of 1815, that of
Castlereagh, Metternich and Alexander I." The Ascendancy of Europe. (Totowa, NJ:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1972), pp. 22-3. Richard Rosecrance says simply "After Paris
the Concert collapsed." Action and Reaction in World Politics. (Boston: Little, Brown,
1963), p. 117.
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is the result of the break-up of the Soviet empire and the consequent end of the cold
war. The bipolar structure of the cold war had guided great power politics, as had the
Concert of Europe, for over four decades. The drawing down of the cold war,
punctuated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, marked the end of that system and
the beginning of a new international structure. In both cases, changes in the behavior
of the states in the system are to be expected because, as Waltz argues, the
"structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across a
system's units. And changes in structure change expectations about how the units of
the system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will produce." 148
1. British and American Hegemonies
"A state's utility in structural realism," says Robert Powell, " is at least partly a
function of some relative measure like power." 149 Developing a system for measuring
power is not the purpose of this work, but some measures will be presented. 150 For
the period in question for Great Britain, William B. Moul finds that "the mean of the
percent shares of iron production, steel production, energy consumption, numbers of
military personnel and military expenditures held by each great power provides the
148 Waltz, 1979. p. 97.
149 Robert Powell. "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations
Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), p. 1303.
150 Among those who have developed systems for quantifying power is William
B. Moul, "Measuring the Balances of Power: A Look at Some Numbers," Review of
International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 101-121; and A. F. K. Organski
and Jacek Kugler in The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.
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best measure of power capabilities," 151 and for each year in the period Great Britain
shows the greatest power capability. Paul Kennedy comes to a similar conclusion
based on much the same evidence:
Around 1860, which was probably when the country
reached its zenith in relative terms, the United Kingdom
produced 53 percent of the world's iron and 50 percent of
its coal and lignite, and consumed just under half of the
raw cotton output of the globe. With 2 percent of the
world's population and 10 percent of Europe's, the United
Kingdom would seem to have had a capacity in modern
industries equal to 40-45 percent of the world's potential
and 55-60 percent of that in Europe. 152
The position of the United States as the predominant power is in the current
international system is perhaps unchallengeable, as Christopher Layne points out,
"There are other states that are formidable militarily (Russia) or economically (Japan
and Germany). However, because only the United States possesses imposing
strength in all categories of great power capability, it enjoys a preeminent role in
international politics." 153 As Samuel P. Huntington puts it, "The United States is
clearly the only country that could be called a superpower." 154
151
Moul, p. 116.
152 Kennedy, 1987. p. 151.
153 Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 5.
154 Samuel P. Huntington. "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival,
Vol. 33, No. 1 (January/February 1991), p. 6.
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B. CASE ONE—BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM
Although by no means a complete history of the two decades which followed
the Crimean conflict, this case covers the major diplomatic events of those years.
From the hypotheses, several behaviors are expected. First, in cases where alliances
were sought, states should show sensitivity to the ideas of abandonment and
entrapment as well as to the potential sovereignty costs of forming an alliance.
Second, and as a result, the greater powers should exhibit the tendency to balance
internally rather than externally. Conversely, where they play a role at all, the lesser
powers should tend toward external behavior as a consequence of their limited
options. Finally, as the largest power in the system, the balancing exhibited should
be directed in the main against Great Britain. Each of these predictions will be
discussed in turn.
1. The Costs of Alliance: Sovereignty, Abandonment and Entrapment
Among the great powers, the period from the end of the Crimean War until the
Berlin Congress is remarkable for its lack alliances between the great powers. Other
than various mutual guarantees of the independence of smaller states, the great
powers themselves entered into only two alliances among themselves. The
Convention of Schonbrunn in 1873 (Austria-Hungary and Russia), and the "Three
Emperor's League." In the event, neither proved to be either very effective or
particularly binding. Other attempts at forming alliance, primarily associated with the
major conflicts of the period, were variously contravened by the costs involved.
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Potential policy limitations are in evidence in the failure of France and Russia
to come to an alliance following the Crimean War. Both states were interested in
revision—France in the West and Russia in the East—but could not come to any
agreement. As Bridge and Bullen relate:
Napoleon III in the late 1850s was, like Polignac in the late
1820s, anxious to link Russian dissatisfaction in the Near
East with French dissatisfaction in Europe. In one
important respect, however, he modified the legacy of
Polignac: whereas the latter had wanted a Franco-Russian
alliance directed against England and Austria, Napoleon
strove to maintain good relations with England at the same
time as he attempted to establish closer relations with
Russia. This meant that he could not offer the Russians a
direct and brutal bargain: French support for Russian
revision in the Near East in return for Russian support for
French revision in the west. The most he could offer was
French support to rid Russia of the Black Sea clauses at
another five-power congress. In fact, therefore, the two
powers could not agree to work together; all they could do
was promise not to work against each other. 155
Policy limitations also prevented Austria from finding allies, either in war or
peace. Specifically, Austria's commitment to maintaining its sovereignty in all of its
provinces left it unable to find allies. In 1859, both Prussia and Russia were sought
as allies against the French. The Prussian price for alliance was recognition of its
dominance in Germany, the Russian price was Austrian support for Russian advances
in the Near East, but ". . . the Austrians would not modify their policy of defending the
empire in its entirety."156 Alliance hopes therefore foundered on Austrian




unwillingness to compromise their policy The result of that unwillingness was that
"[ajfter 1856 the Austnans were forced to rely on their own strength and their treaty
rights to maintain their empire in its entirety." 157
Similarly, fears of entrapment also hindered alliance formation. France
searched for an ally against Prussia prior to the Franco-Prussian War. Austria,
following its defeat in the Seven Weeks War, looked to be an excellent partner. In
fact, "[i]n the event of a French victory, Beust [foreign minister] was prepared to join
the wining side to revise the settlement of 1866, but he was determined to avoid
another defeat for Austria. In his negotiations with the French Beust wanted
friendship without binding commitments." 158 "The French had also expected the
goodwill of Russia; this too was denied them." 159 Its potential allies' fear of being
caught on the losing side prevented France's balancing externally.
Fears of abandonment were not groundless, as abandonment was a part of the
international relations of the day. In the War of 1859, France was the ally of Sardinia
in its attempt to secure from Austria the province of Venetia. That support had been
duly paid for with the promise that Sardinian possessions of Nice and Savoy would be
ceded to France. The French, however, shaken by their losses at Solferino, and
lacking public support, decided unilaterally to quit the war. "Without consulting his








finding him as eager to abandon the war as he had been to bolt it, concluded an
armistice with him at Villafranca on July 1 1 ." 160 Under the terms of the treaty, Austria
retained Venetia, and thus violated the agreement with Sardinia—" the Italians,"
according to Langer, " never quite forgave him for his defection." 161
This sort of behavior could perhaps be described (charitably) as flexibility of
alliance. Although not so stark a defection, France again demonstrated its flexibility
prior to the Seven Weeks War. French and German discussions had taken place at
Biarritz in October 1865, and "while no formal agreement was made, there seems to
have been an understanding that France would remain neutral in the case of a
German war." 162 In June of 1866, however, they negotiated with an agreement with
Austria, under the terms of which "they [the Austrians] agreed to cede Venetia to the
French who in turn transferred it to Italy. This belated recognition of the realities of
the plight which faced Austria brought little in the way of consolation; the Italians still
entered the war to fulfill their alliance obligations to Prussia and the French made no
positive offers of support." 163 The French thus pledged neutrality to Prussia, made an
agreement with Austria to support them in exchange for Venetia, and then, in the end,
did nothing.
160 Gordon A. Craig. Europe, 1815-1914, (Fort Worth: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1971), p. 197.
161 Langer, p. 6.
162
Craig, p. 211.
163 Bridge and Bullen, p. 104.
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That "flexibility" worked to the disadvantage of the French in the Franco-
Prussian War, however. Although "it was felt in Paris in 1870 that Austria and Italy
could be counted upon if a crisis arose," 164 Austria, as discussed above, could not
chance another defeat by Prussia. As for Italy, "even though many Italians were
grateful to Napoleon for his services to their country, they were unwilling to commit
themselves to go to war for a government whose troops still denied them the
possession of Rome. Since Napoleon dared not alienate Catholic opinion in France
by withdrawing the garrison that had protected the pope since 1849, the Italian
alliance, like the Austrian one, went aglimmering." 165 Italy paid the French back for
1859 when "[i]nstead of coming to the assistance of the French the Italians consoled
themselves with the occupation of Rome." 166
Russia also played the game. Prior to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, Russia
secured "Austrian neutrality, which was more important than anything else for the
Russians" 167 with the Treaty of Budapest. "The price had been high, but Austrian
abstention was hardly less than a sine qua non for waging the war at all." 168 The
terms of that treaty were completely revoked by the Treaty of San Stefano, which, in
part precipitated the Congress of Berlin.
164 Langer, p. 7.
165
Craig, p. 235.







If the costs of alliance proved high to the great powers of the mid-nineteenth
century, internal efforts to enhance their power would be an option on which they
could rely. Since the power of Great Britain was to a large extent based on "modern,
wealth producing industry, with all the benefits which flowed from it," 169 efforts by the
other powers in increasing their industrial output would be one way to measure their
reliance on that option (see Table 1 )
170
.
1856 1878 % change
Great Britain 28.1 47.3 68%
Austria 171 — — —
France 38.1 47.4 24%
Italy 32 172 44 38%
Prussia 11 28 254%
Russia 8.8 173 18 105%
Table 1. Indices of Industrial Production (1913=100)
169 Kennedy, 1987. p. 152.
170 Data from European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970, by B. R. Mitchell (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
171 Data for Austria unavailable.
172 Data from 1861.
173 Data for 1860.
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Although an index of industrial production does not measure industrial output
relative to other powers (rather it measures a states level of industrialization relative
to itself) the pace of each country's industrialization can be shown to be increasing.
That increase was especially rapid in Germany, the power which more than any other
challenged Britain's hegemony directly. Anderson notes that "Germany's economy
expanded spectacularly in the middle 1850s; and though the rate of growth fell
somewhat in the 1860s it remained very high." 174 That fact meant that, due to its
internal growth, the Prussian government "need not fear the financial strains of war;
the campaign against Denmark in 1864 was paid for out of ordinary government
revenues."
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"Britain," as Layne notes, " was the first world power and it was the
model other rising powers sought to imitate as they climbed to great power status. In
other words, the sameness effect was very much in evidence." 176
Given that there was no practical way to dramatically increase the population of
a state through the natural process, the other way to balance "internally" was through
territorial aggrandizement. Acquisition of additional territory would increase the
landmass as well as the population of a state, both important determinants of a states
power. It should not be surprising, then that each of the powers was interested at a
minimum in the protection of its territories, and most attempted to expand them.
174 Anderson, p. 28.
175 Bridge and Bullen, p. 97.
176
Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 21.
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France acquired Nice and Savoy, and desired at various times Belgium and
Luxembourg. Austria's insistence on maintaining those provinces which were under
its control led to the War of 1859, contributed to the Seven Weeks War, and
determined its policy in the Balkans. The most successful "aggrandizers" in Europe
were, however, Prussia and Italy.
According to Moul's power capability index, Prussia was the smallest of the
European powers in 1856, but by the Congress of Berlin had surpassed Austria and
Russia, and was effectively the equal of France. 177 As a result of the Seven Weeks
War, Prussia was "larger, more populous and richer than all the other German states
combined."178 The further annexations of Alsace and Lorraine after the Franco-
Prussian War meant that by 1871 , "[i]n terms of material power, Germany was
dominant on the continent." 179
The story of Italy is similar, though it was not as successful as Germany.
Through its efforts in achieving national unification, however, Italy became recognized
as a great power when it had until that time only been a geographic expression.
Where the population of the largest Italian state, the Kingdom of Naples, was less
than seven million in 1857, united Italy represented some twenty-eight million
persons by 1878. Although "Italy was the most recently recognized great power and
177
Moul's power capability percentage shares are given in the appendix to
"Measuring the Balances of Power."
178 Bridge and Bullen, p. 105.
179 Rosecrance, 1963, p. 125.
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the one whose status was the most in question as a result of her unhappy military
past."
180 her internal efforts were what brought her to that point. The result to the
balance of power of both of these efforts was that "[t]wo major peoples of Europe, the
Germans and the Italians, had come together in nation states, and could now be
counted as forces for stability rather than disruption." 181
3. Balancing Against Britain
The tendency of the great powers in the mid-nineteenth century was to act
alone, and the states which provided for their own security most effectively did so
through internal efforts. "For the protection of their essential interests," according to
Professor Craig, "the powers preferred to rely on their own resources." 182 It is held
that the effect of the system is that the actions of those states in providing for their
own security should result in their power balancing against that of the hegemon—in
this case Great Britain. Because the theory is clear that this result should occur
independently of the policies of the balancers, the concept is difficult to measure.
One indication, however, in spite of that specification, would be examples of an
appreciation, or fear, of that power.
180
Craig, p. 250.
181 Michael Howard. War and the Liberal Conscience. (New Brunswick, NJ:




France exhibited just such an appreciation. France desired control of Belgium,
Russian support for which could have been purchased by French support for revision
of the treaty of 1856. England, however, had its interest in the maintenance of
Belgium's independence, and France was "[d]enied this opportunity by fear of
England." 183 Russia too, appreciated Britain's power. As Bridge and Bullen note,
"[sjince the Crimean War, the Tsar was convinced that he was facing a British
offensive on a world-wide scale." 184 The result was that "[i]n the fifteen years after the
Crimean War the British and the Russians ceased either directly or indirectly to
cooperate." 185 Russian efforts in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and over the Straits
were all directed against British power.
The case of Prussia/Germany is clearer. According to Christopher Layne,
"Germany's rise to world power status was most obviously a direct response to
Britain's hegemony.
. .
" 186 According to William Langer, "[t]he Germans came to
resent British power and even British efforts to maintain their position unimpaired."187
The British, too, felt the threat which was posed by Germany and the others. In
reference to German victories in 1871, Disraeli said "The balance of power has been





186 Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 21.
187 William L. Langer. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, 2d ed. (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 416. Quoted in Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 22.
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entirely destroyed, and the country which suffers most, and feels the effects of this
great change most, is England." 188 England was also acutely conscious French and
Russian activities. As Kennedy relates, "Russia, recovering from the Crimean war,
seemed [to the British] as restless in Asia as she was ambitious in the Balkans. . .
[and] France's moves over Egypt gave fresh grounds for concern as the construction
of the Suez Canal steadily progressed." 189
C. CASE TWO—THE U. S. AND THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
The nineteenth century case showed the preference of great powers toward
internal balancing, while the lesser powers played a limited role in the international
system. Two factors which were not present in the mid-nineteenth century should
work to redress that imbalance somewhat. First, "[t]he accepted norms of
international conduct in the postwar restrict the use of direct force against the weak
states. . .
"19
° (also limiting the nineteenth century option of territorial
aggrandizement). Second, the presence of nuclear weapons offers states a new
means to achieve security that is disproportionate to their population/GNP. From the
theory, then, the expected behavior of states is to balance internally, given the means.
188 Langer, 1955, p. 14.
189 Paul Kennedy. The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914.
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 17.
190
Handel, p. 176. See also Appendix B, pp. 265-276.
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Those means now include developing weapons of mass destruction, a capability that
expands the group of countries that possess the means to balance internally.
Testing the behavior of states in the post-cold war international system
presents several problems. In spite of the break up of the Warsaw Pact, the world's
alliance structure still reflects that of the cold war. NATO is still in place and Japan is
still under the security wing of the United States, accounting for five of the seven great
powers. It is difficult to measure the balancing choices of the great powers in a
multipolar world given that the structure of the bipolar one is still, to some degree, in
place. In addition, the post-cold war international system has only been in place for
five years which, due to the time lag in statistics being made available, creates a
problem in data acquisition. 191 The break up of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution
of the Soviet Union have already, however, created new balancing choices for several
countries and any loosening of the security ties of the West could create many more.
The choices made by these "balancers" could have a significant impact on the future
of international relations.
191
I prefer to use the sweeping changes in Europe of 1989 as a starting point.
Given that, the first post-cold war data points should appear in 1 990
—
yielding four
years of data. The most recent published statistics (World Bank's World Tables, 1994
and the UN's Statistical Annual) are, however, those for 1991 thereby cutting the
available data to two years. That time span is too short and too close to the cold war to
provide meaningful measures of post-cold war behavior.
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1. Costs of Alliance
The nineteenth century case showed the non-monetary costs associated with
alliance. In the current era the monetary cost can be more readily assessed. States
were chosen and grouped according to three criteria. First, the sample was limited to
the upper fifty per cent of states based on GNP rank order. 192 Second, that sample
was reduced by limiting inclusion to those states with some significant level of
industrialization, defined as industrial production making up at least twenty-five per
cent of GDP. Not surprisingly, there was a high degree of correlation between GNP
and industrialization. Both of these steps were taken in order to produce a sample
that was not only manageable, but which also represented states of some level of
power, and possessing some potential for production of sophisticated weaponry.
These states were then grouped according to whether they were in a security alliance
or not.
Military expenditure as a percentage of Gross National Product (ME/GNP) was
selected as a reasonable measure of a state's internal effort to provide for its security,
and 1991 data was used. That cost was then compared between states that are part
of defensive alliances and states which are not. Data for Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
192 Data on GNP and ME are primarily from World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers, 1991-1992 (Washington, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1992). Level of Industrialization measures are taken from World Development
Report, 1993 (published for the World Bank in, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
Information on alliances is drawn from several sources, including: Treaties in Force,
1994 (Washington: U. S. Department of State, 1994), Lambert's Worldwide Directory of
Defense Authorities (Washington: Lambert, 1984), and The Statesman's Yearbook,
1994-95 (Brian Hunter, ed. New York: St. Martin's, 1994).
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and the UAE were not considered in order to control for the Gulf War. Data for the
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were not available.
The data shows that the mean spending of aligned countries was 2.85% of
GNP, and those of non-aligned countries was 4 20%. This difference is even more
pronounced if the neutral states of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland are excluded;
raising the mean spending of non-allied countries to 4.67%. It seems clear then, from
this "snapshot" of data, that there are economic benefits from joining defensive
alliances.
Fears of abandonment and entrapment, however, still exist. The fear of
entrapment certainly is playing a role in the hesitancy of the West to extend security
guarantees to the former members of the Warsaw Pact as well as former Soviet
Republics. Asmus, et al, show the nature of that fear by offering an example: "A
situation in which a country like Germany would extend a security commitment to
Poland through the WEU, but not through NATO, could destroy the Atlantic Alliance.
For Washington it would create a situation like that which existed among the
European powers prior to World War I—where the entangling commitments of a
country enjoying an American security guarantee could draw the United States into a
conflict over which it had little if any control."193
Abandonment also plays into a state's decision making processes. The •
motivation for the French development of their independent nuclear force was at least
193 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee. "Building a
New NATO," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Sept/Oct 1993), p. 35.
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partially fear of abandonment. Wilfrid Kohl, in explaining that development writes that
"a growing French awareness of the dangers created by excessive strategic
dependence on the United States" was a contributory factor. 194
2. Balancing in the Nuclear Age
The idea that states will develop nuclear weapons to provide internal balance
in the nuclear multipolar age is a difficult one to test. The emerging multipolarity has
as of yet not developed to the point where any prediction that it will or will not happen
can be proven, but that is the nature of prediction. As a method of testing, the
tendency for non-allied states to develop or not to develop WMD as a method of
balancing will be looked at. Difficulty again appears. The pervasiveness of the
superpower struggle ensured that one or both superpowers at one or another time
coveted nearly every state, but currently none of these states is in an unequivocal
security alliance. Again disregarding declared neutrals and stipulating the same level
of industrialization, The following states were coded as being non-aligned: China
(PRC), India, Taiwan, Poland, Indonesia, Czech Republic, South Africa, Romania,
Iran, Israel, Hungary, Algeria, Bulgaria, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, North Korea,
Iraq and Tunisia. The question is, what is the tendency of these states to develop
WMD? Of this list, ten are known, or suspected of either possessing or be attempting
194
Wilfrid Kohl. French Nuclear Diplomacy. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1971), p. 3.
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to develop WMD. 195 Statistically, a fifty percent distribution is meaningless, but in the
real world, a fifty percent chance that a country would seek WMD as a security
alternative could be very meaningful. It may be too soon to tell what the former
Soviet clients/Republics will do in the long-run. Movement toward NATO has been
their general characteristic, but, particularly if rebuffed by the West, those "[f]ormer
Soviet clients may at once be more desperate (lacking a superpower patron) and
more autonomous (lacking a superpower to restrain them)." 196
3. Balancing Against the United States: The Breakup of NATO?
Glenn Snyder wrote in 1984 that "It follows that those who see NATO's current
crisis as heralding its collapse tend to confuse cause and effect. Although the
disagreements have arisen from a variety of proximate causes, they persist largely
because the alliance cannot break up. Since NATO is a product of the bipolar
structure of the system, it cannot collapse or change basically until that structure
195 China, India, Taiwan, South Africa, Iran, Israel, Libya, Egypt, North Korea and
Iraq. All except Egypt have, had, or tried to develop nuclear weapons. See Lewis A.
Dunn, "Containing Nuclear Proliferation," Adelphi Papers 263 (London: Brassey's for
the IISS, 1991), pp. 6-16. According to the Central Intelligence Agency list (as reported
in Newsweek, September 19, 1988, p. 30) all also have or all developing chemical
weapons. The "born proliferators" in the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
Belorus) also possess nuclear weapons, although they did not "choose" to develop
them. Choosing to keep them, however, would give the same indication.
196 the quote is from Jervis, 1991/92, p. 63. Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania and Albania have applied for NATO membership. London
Times, 9 January 1994, p. 14, col. f.
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changes." 197 His 1984 observation is interesting because that bipolar structure has
broken up, nullifying Snyder's condition.
George Liska notes that "[alliances are against, and only derivatively for,
someone or something," 198 an idea that is supported by both Walt's contention that
states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone" 199 and by
Waltz's ideas concerning the breakup of war-winning coalitions. 200 Keohane
criticizes the threat/capability "ambiguity," between Walt's and Waltz's theories, but
the security dilemma tells us that threat inheres in capability. 201 The security dilemma
refutes the notion that the benign nature of US hegemony will in some way constrain
states from balancing against it.
The reduction, therefore of the threat which was posed by the Soviet Union will
likely lead states, if not to become antagonistic toward it, to reduce their degree of
commitment to the US, as they were driven into these arrangements as part of a
balancing against that threat. "Already," notes Robert Hunter, "economic bargaining
197 Glenn Snyder, 1984, pp. 494-5.
198 George Liska. Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 12.
199 Walt, 1987, p. 5.
200 Waltz writes: "If two coalitions form and one of them weakens, perhaps •
because of the political disorder of a member, we expect the extent of the other
coalition's military preparation to slacken or its unity to lessen. The classic example of
the latter effect is the breaking apart of a war-winning coalition in or just after the
moment of victory." (Waltz, 1979. p. 126).
201 Robert 0. Keohane. "Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism,"
International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), p. 171.
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across both the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans has lost a key ingredient: the special
weight in the scales, favoring the U. S. position, that was so for long provided by
America's once-leading export, security."202
Robert Jervis notes that "[a] parallel—and more disturbing—test will be
whether Germany and Japan, freed from the security and constraints of the cold war,
will seek nuclear weapons, following the previous rule that great powers seek the
most prestigious and powerful military weapons available even in the absence of a
clear threat."203 Michael May holds that "[t]here is no doubt that Japan could develop
and field survivable nuclear forces, given its technological prowess, Japan technically
could play the nuclear deterrence game as well as anyone."204 Certainly Germany
could also. Britain and France already possess the nuclear capability which would
allow them to chart a more independent course.
If active balancing against the United States by its current allies is not yet
apparent, Zakaria offers this reason: "America and, to a lesser extent Great Britain,
followed policies that concentrated on essentials, building economic power at home
and commercial links abroad. Each was the most important power of its time but did
not try to destroy other great powers."205 This does not change the fact, however, that
202 Robert E. Hunter, "Starting at Zero: U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1990s," The
Washington Quarterly, Winter 1992, p. 32.
203
Jervis, 1991/92, p. 47.
204 Michael M. May, "Japan as a Superpower?" International Security, Vol. 18,




"[m]any of the basic generalizations of international politics remain unaltered: it is still
anarchic in the sense that there is no international sovereign that can make and
enforce laws and agreements. The security dilemma remains as well, with the
problems it creates for states who would like to cooperate but whose security
requirements do not mesh."206
Dean Rusk said that "America's alliances are at the heart of the maintenance of
peace, and if it should be discovered that the pledge of America was worthless, the
structure of peace would crumble and we would be well on our way to a terrible
catastrophe."207 While it is not held here that America's pledge is worthless, the
durability of America's alliances may be endangered from the systemic forces at play
in the emerging multipolarity. Remember from the chapter on balancing, that states
do not have to act with the motive or intent of balancing against the United States.
The action of a state in an anarchic system to ensure its own survival will produce the
balance.
"Even if the American economic position had not declined relative to its major
allies," write Tucker and Hendrickson, "America's power would be diminished in a
world in which economic power gradually displaced military power as the ultima ratio
of state relations."208 The economic success of America's current and potential rivals
is in some ways the result of successful American hegemony. That hegemony,
206
Jervis, 1991/92, p. 46.
207
Walt, 1987, p. 3.
208 Tucker and Hendrickson, p. 6.
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"though still unrivalled, has already begun eroding, largely from forces beyond its
control—the uneven nature of international growth, the pace of technological change,
and the free-rider advantages for other countries."209 As more countries find





This paper set out to examine the concept of balancing from the perspective of
neorealist international relations theory. "[B]alance of power theorists from Ranke
forward have persistently and persuasively shown that states facing an external threat
overwhelmingly prefer to balance against the threat rather than bandwagon with it.
This is primarily because an alignment that preserves most of a state's freedom of
action is preferable to accepting subordination under a potential hegemon."210 While
neorealist theory joins other balance of power theory in predicting that systemic
factors will drive states to balance against power, rather than bandwagon with it, it
does little to explain whether a state would do so through internal or external means.
The theory is quite clear is that in a bipolar situation internal balancing is the
preferred option for the great powers. In a multipolar situation, however, those
powers have the option of balancing externally through the mechanism of alliance
formation.
With the current international situation moving from the period of bipoiarity
which was engendered by the cold war to one of multipolarity, the choices made by
the great powers are once again open. The cold war not only provided the motive
force for the balance of power which operated for its decades, but also constrained
the actors of the second tier of states from developing their full capabilities. The"
necessity of maintaining alliance ties to either the United States or the Soviet Union
210 Walt, 1985, p. 15.
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restricted the sovereignty of those states and now those restrictions will be less
binding. Whether these states balance internally or externally could have far-
reaching consequences for the future of the system.
Additionally, it was argued that nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass
destruction) serve to open up the balancing choices of lesser powers. Generally, as
Handel argues, "[t]he attempt of a weak state to augment its own internal strength with
external strength—that of another state, usually a more powerful one—is the result of
necessity, not preference."211 These new weapons, however, may allow the
preference function to come into play for small as well as large states.
The nineteenth century case showed that great powers in a multipolar system
tend to balance internally. Because the costs of alignment in terms of lost sovereignty
and the fear of either abandonment or entrapment were frequently higher than those
states were willing to pay, on the whole alliance was eschewed. That those states
could do so was related to their ability to provide for their own security through
internal means.
Related to that assertion, the data on defense spending shows that, at least for
that snapshot look at it, that those states in alliances spend less on defense than
those which are not. A more systematic look at defense spending in and out of
alliances over a period of several decades would go farther to validate that point. The
importance of that point, however, is this: the cost of balancing internally is greater
211 Michael Handel. Weak States in the International System. (Totowa, NJ: Frank
Cass, 1981), p. 121.
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than that of balancing externally. Given that, there will be states who, regardless of
their preference, simply do not have the resources to effectively provide for their own
security. That assertion, however, has different ramifications in a nuclear world
In a nuclear world, it is held, more security can be purchased for one's defense
dollar. No attempt was made to operationalize that particular concept, and such an
attempt by another would certainly serve to clarify this position. What was done,
however, was to look at those states which were outside the bipolar system during the
cold war to see whether those states opted for nuclear weapons. The reasoning
behind that is these states are internal balancers (if only by default) and had to decide
what method would be the most effective for providing security. It was found that fifty
percent of those states looked at either did develop, or were suspected of developing,
weapons of mass destruction. If other states choose to balance internally, therefore,
there is an indication that they too will seek WMD as a means of defense. Structural
level analysis may, however, be underdeterminate in the case of Japan and Germany.
In both instances domestic and international political forces could stay their hand.
The cases presented have, of course, shortcomings. The period selected for
the nineteenth century case may not have been encompassing enough to present a
clear picture of great power behavior. Alliance formation did, of course, play an ever-
larger role in great power politics in the decades which followed the period in
question. These events were not excluded with the intent of skewing the conclusions
to show a preference for internal balance, but their exclusion may have done so. An
89
examination of that period in light of the hypotheses presented would be another
useful test of the ideas presented herein.
The case of the current era presented its own set of problems. With the cold
war only recently over, there are only a few data points available for observation.
When coupled with the persistence of the alliance pattern established under
bipolarity, it becomes very difficult to predict the balancing choices of the states in the
system. Should the Western alliances continue for some period into the future, or if
Russia or China were to enter into security guarantees with the United States, it
would be safe to say that the theory's predictions about the preference for internal
balance were incorrect. Both of those powers, along with Britain and France, are
already able to provide for their own defense in some measure. Japan and Germany,
though not currently in possession of nuclear weapons, clearly possess the capability
to develop similar power.
Paul Kennedy wrote (in 1987) that
[although the United Sates is at present still in a class of
its own economically and perhaps even militarily, it cannot
avoid confronting the two great tests which challenge the
longevity of every major power that occupies the "number
one" position in world affairs: whether, in the
military/strategical realm, it can preserve a reasonable
balance between the nation's perceived defense
requirements and the means it possesses to maintain
those commitments; and whether, as an intimately related
point, it can preserve the technological and economic
bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of the
ever-shifting patterns of global production. 212
212 Kennedy, 1987, p. 514.
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What may be a more relevant question is whether it might want to. If states
balance, they should balance all the more against preponderant power. If that
balancing takes the form of the breakup of the current alliance structure (due to states
preference for internal balancing) and the proliferation of WMD (due to their perceived
cost effectiveness) the security position of the United States will not be enhanced.
Waltz points out that "[t]hrough all of the changes of boundaries, of social,
economic, and political form, of economic and military activity, the substance and style
of international politics remains strikingly constant."213 Balancing in a multipolar world
means that other great powers will continue to emerge and the capabilities, both
economic and military, of lesser powers will continue to develop. The fact of easier
WMD accessibility ensures that the actions of those smaller powers will have an ever
increasing impact on the security of the United States.
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